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Abstract 
The Tarasoff decisions regarding the duties to third parties were profoundly significant to the 
practice of psychology and counseling. Despite this, there have been few studies regarding the 
impact on these decisions on clinical practice. There are essentially three sources of data 
regarding the analysis of any Tarasoff-related clinical scenario. They include state statutes, court 
case law and the professional ethics codes. Most of the limited studies conducted have indicated 
serious knowledge gaps with respect to relevant state statues and the essence of the Tarasoff 
duties. This study evaluated West Virginia therapists’ knowledge of Tarasoff-related court cases. 
It was hypothesized that the overall knowledge level of the original Tarasoff decisions and the 
subsequent Tarasoff court cases would be low. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that there 
would be no differences between measured accuracy rates of court cases and  practitioner’s 
discipline, years of experiences, or continuing educational experiences. With some moderate 
exceptions, all hypotheses were verified. The overall knowledge and understanding by 
respondents regarding Tarasoff- related court cases was low even though their overall levels of 
confidence about their knowledge were relatively high. Furthermore, respondents revealed a 
fundamental misunderstanding about judicial imperatives and their impact on other jurisdictions 
and professional codes of ethics. The implications of these findings were discussed in terms of 
risk management, supervision and consultation.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
It has been nearly 40 years since the rendering of the landmark Tarasoff decisions from 
the state of California, which established the duties to warn and protect a third-party, who could 
be a potential target of threats expressed by a patient during an otherwise confidential 
psychotherapy session (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California 1974; Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California, 1976). The decisions essentially codified an exception to 
the long-standing ethical and clinical tradition of therapist-patient confidentiality (Mills, 1984; 
Stone, 1976; Wise, 1978).  The decisions initiated a great deal of concern among professionals 
about the impact of both legitimized and mandatory breaches of patient confidentiality on the 
therapeutic relationship. Since those decisions, other courts have used the Tarasoff decisions as 
the basis for their judicial renderings in cases involving potential violence or harm to third-
parties perpetrated by clients of therapists who knew or should have known of the risks. The 
Tarasoff reasoning has been applied to such disparate issues as impaired drivers (Love, Welsh, 
Knabb, Scott & Brokaw, 2008; Pettis, 1992; Pettis & Gutheil,1993), genetic diseases ( Petrila, 
2001; Pullman & Hodgkinson, 2006) and cases involving repressed memories and abuse 
allegations (Slovenko, 1999). It has even been hypothesized as potentially relevant for 
researchers when participants reveal potentially threatening behaviors (Appelbaum, & 
Rosenbaum, 1989). It has also been argued that the Tarasoff reasoning could be relevant in HIV 
cases (Chenneville, 2000; DiMarco & Zoline, 2004; Fleetwood, 2006; Huprich, Fuller & 
Schneider, 2003; Simone & Fulero, 2001). 
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During the decades that followed the original Tarasoff court decisions, many states 
addressed the concerns expressed by professional organizations by codifying statutes that 
provided legal language relative to the issues of duty to warn and protect (Buckner & Firestone, 
2000; Kachigian & Felthous, 2004). These statutory remedies range from permissive statutes (for 
example, West Virginia) to state codes establishing an affirmative duty to warn under specified 
circumstances. Many state statutes include the manner in which those established duties could be 
legally discharged and the degree of immunity from prosecution for professionals who breach 
patient confidentiality in order to comply with the law. A small number of state legislatures have 
remained silent on the issue (Herbert, 2002; Herbert & Young, 2002; Kachigian & Felthous, 
2004).     
Instead of promoting consistency and clarifying professional expectations and standards, 
these legislative initiatives and subsequent judicial decisions created varying degrees of ethical 
and clinical ambiguities for practitioners across the country (Felthous, 2006; Herbert & Young, 
2002). Thus, where a clinician practices, in many instances, guides the management of these 
clinical scenarios rather than guidelines driven by professional consensus or the applicable code 
of ethics. 
  Prior judicial decisions constitute precedent upon which subsequent judicial analyses are 
conducted. Some state legislatures have utilized the Tarasoff-related court decisions to address 
concerns expressed by professionals about managing duty to warn imperatives and balancing the 
ethical standards related to confidentiality. Despite those initiatives at the state level, (Kachigian 
& Felthous, 2004) observed in some states where there were statutory duties to warn and protect, 
that their respective judicial courts often did not even reference their own state statute in their 
analyses of duty to warn cases. Thus, the judicial impetus and the extensive breadth of 
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subsequent Tarasoff cases have become important and dynamic factors in how clinicians 
evaluate and respond to duty to warn cases and the potential duties to third-parties (Fox, 2010; 
Quattrocchi, & Schopp, 1993). 
This project evaluated West Virginia mental health practitioners’ knowledge of court 
findings related to duty to protect or warn third-parties. Participants were asked to provide 
minimal demographic information including type of practice, years of practice, and experiences 
with duties to warn or protect. Participants were asked to evaluate implications of the original 
Tarasoff decisions. In addition, they were provided scenarios presented based upon the 
particulars of actual court decisions. Participants evaluated each scenario based upon what they 
would do as clinicians and what they believed the court decided. Finally, the participants will be 
asked to rate their degree of confidence about their respective responses to each analysis.  
An understanding of judicial precedents as it relates to duties to warn or protect is 
significant for several reasons. First, rulings from one judicial circuit are often used as the basis 
for subsequent litigation in another jurisdiction as was true for the original Tarasoff cases. In 
order for therapists to practice ethically and manage risks, they need to have an understanding of 
significant findings from their own, as well as other, jurisdictions which could impact their 
ability to ethically manage risk in their practice (Hansen & Goldberg, 1999).  Some of these 
findings may have direct impact on the way informed consent is articulated or the manner in 
which the warning is issued or documented. Monahan (1993) emphasized that because there are 
no legal standards for assessment of patient risk for violence, clinicians should be aware of the 
legal standards in their jurisdiction. He also opined that the state statues will likely undergo 
additional adjudication for clarity of statute language (Monahan, 1993). 
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Second, having a working knowledge of relevant judicial findings is advantageous in that 
the findings may include some nuance that is an improvement over current clinical practices. 
These changes could still consistent with ethics codes and current state statute. Fox (2010) 
opined that the Tarasoff duties have shaped some aspects of clinical assessment, particularly in 
the area of dangerousness, that have now become routine.  
Third, in order to adequately attend to issues of risk management, it would be helpful for 
clinicians to have a working knowledge of judicial findings and incorporate that knowledge of 
those findings in the documentation of the decision-making process in actual cases involving 
duties to third-parties (VandeCreek & Knapp, 2000).  Monahan (1993) has concluded that 
comprehensive documentation and demonstrating reasoning helps psychologists and other 
mental health professionals manage risk. Demonstrating that such findings are contemplated in 
the process shows due diligence.  
Fourth, the significance of these research findings and this particular issue of judicial 
rulings cannot be overstated in terms of issues related to clinical supervision and case 
consultation. For example, most researchers in this area have generally recommended that part of 
the clinical protocol involve consultation with peers. Furthermore, research has concluded that 
both training programs and continuing education efforts are falling short of bridging a 
knowledge gap around issues of duty to protect (Pabian, Welfel, & Beebe 2009; VandeCreek & 
Knapp, 1989; Tolman, 2001).  
There were five hypotheses for this project. First, the overall knowledge therapists have 
regarding Tarasoff- related court cases will be low. Second, there will be no differences observed 
between psychologists and counselors regarding their respective accuracy rates and knowledge 
of Tarasoff- related court cases. Third, the overall accuracy rates for counselors and 
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psychologists regarding their understanding of the original Tarasoff decision will be low and will 
have no significant differences between the disciplines. Fourth, there will be no relationship 
between accuracy ratings of the post Tarasoff- related court cases and continuing education 
experiences. Finally, the accuracy ratings of psychologists and counselors on the post Tarasoff- 
related cases will not be related significantly to years of experience 
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  Chapter 2         
Literature Review 
  The original Tarasoff case centered on the circumstances that preceded of the murder of a 
college student by a man who had made threats about her to his therapist. Tatiana Tarasoff was a 
young Russian-American woman who attended a community college in California and planned 
to eventually study at the University of California at Berkeley.  She met a Bengalese graduate 
student, Prosenjit Poddar, who pursued Tatiana romantically. They saw one another regularly but 
she reportedly had no romantic interests in him. Poddar grew increasingly obsessed with 
Tarasoff. She made it known to him that she had no interest in a relationship with him. 
A few months later, after she adamantly rejected his marriage proposal, Poddar became 
paranoid and his preoccupation with Tatiana became more intense. He was demanding of her 
time and scolded her when she fell short of his expectations. He taped phone conversations with 
her, listened to them repetitively and told his roommate he was in love with her and, later, that he 
had thoughts of killing her. 
Tatiana went to Brazil during the summer of 1969. During this period, Poddar sought 
counseling. He was evaluated by Dr. Stuart Gold, psychiatrist at Cowell Memorial Hospital 
(University Hospital) on an outpatient basis. He also saw psychologist, Dr. Lawrence Moore. 
The client repeatedly shared his homicidal thoughts in the course of the first eight sessions. Dr. 
Moore told Poddar of his intention to detain him if he continued the threats. During the ninth 
session on August 18, 1969, Poddar verbalized that he was going to kill an unidentifiable female 
when she returned to California from Brazil. 
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Two days later, Dr. Moore informed two campus police officers that Poddar was capable 
of harming others and possibly himself. Moore also, on the same day, August 20th, wrote a letter 
to the Chief of Campus Police describing Mr. Poddar’s clinical symptoms and that he was a 
danger to self and others. Dr. Moore stated that if Poddar were taken into custody and 
transported by police to Herrick Hospital, he (Moore) would sign an emergency detention order 
for Poddar to be held and evaluated. Dr. Moore further declared to the campus police that the 
client could present as rather rational at times. The psychologist’s supervisors in the Psychiatry 
Department at Cowell Memorial agreed that Poddar met the requirements for the 72 hour 
detainment. 
The campus police found Poddar at his apartment and interviewed him in the presence of 
his roommate. The interviewee admitted having a conflicted relationship with an unidentified 
woman but did not acknowledge any threats to harm her. The officers were satisfied that Poddar 
was rational and released him on his promise to stay away from the girl. 
The university’s health services chief of psychiatry asked the police to return the 
psychologist’s letter and directed that any documentation concerning the case be destroyed. He 
ordered no action take place with regard to the request for the detainment in a treatment and 
evaluation facility. 
Tatiana returned from Brazil in October. On October 27, Poddar went to her home. He 
found her alone and shot her with a pellet gun. She ran from the house to the yard where he 
fatally stabbed her 37 times. He called the police and awaited arrest. 
Tatiana’s parents sued the university’s chief of psychiatry, the psychiatrist who initially 
interviewed Poddar, the treating psychologist and another consulting campus psychiatrist and the 
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campus police, alleging that defendant therapists did in fact predict the patient’s violence and 
there was negligence for not warning her ( Buckner & Firestone , 2000; Hubbard, 2007; 
Mossman,  2007). 
  Psychotherapy is based upon the effectiveness of the therapeutic relationship between the 
client and therapist (Baird & Rupert, 1987; Chaimowitz, Glancy, & Blackburn, 2000; Fisher, 
2008; Stone, 1976). One of the most important aspects of the relationship is that it is confidential 
in nature. The issues raised in the original Tarasoff decisions involve warning and possibly 
taking steps to protect a potential victim. The warning of a third-party outside the therapeutic 
relationship involves violating the client’s expectation of confidentiality. Therefore, 
confidentiality is best conceptualized as a conditional aspect of the relationship. Thus, when 
clients threaten third-parties, therapists are expected to breach confidentiality in order to protect 
the safety of others. Part of the ethical and legal conflicts involved in duty to warn scenarios are 
the tension between the confidentiality of the client and the duty to protect third-parties (Resnick, 
& Scott, 1997). Psychotherapists are now in the tenuous position of being held liable for 
breaching client confidentiality or for negligent failing to adequately protect the safety of a third 
party (Gutheil, 2001). 
Ethical conflicts in the area of confidentiality have consistently been ranked among the 
most frequent and the most troubling dilemmas facing psychologists and other therapist (Helbok 
2003; Helbok, Marinelli & Walls, 2006; Knapp, Gottlieb, Berman & Handelsman, 2007; Haas,  
Malouf, & Mayerson ,1988 ; Haas, Malouf, & Mayerson,1986 ; Pope & Vetter, 1992). To further 
complicate the matter, the literature reviews and judicial decisions in the area of duties to third-
parties, which arise from client threats, often includes conflating confidentiality, privilege, and 
privacy (Klinka, 2009; Watts & Stankowski, 2009). Privacy is a complex concept which 
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generally refers to an individual's right to be free from the unwarranted intrusions by others and 
the right to limit the access others have to a person’s personal affairs. Privacy is often considered 
a constitutional right in the United States (Weiner & Wettstein, 1993). Confidentiality, on the 
other hand, is often conceptualized as the professional duty to not disclose information obtained 
during the provision of diagnostic and treatment services, which could potentially harm the client 
or the therapeutic relationship (Klinka, 2009; Watts & Stankowski, 2009; Weiner & Wettstein, 
1993). 
Confidentiality is based upon professional ethics and generally applies to therapeutic and 
fiduciary relationships and professional interactions. By contrast, privilege is strictly a legal 
concept based upon the types of evidence which are made discoverable during litigation. 
Because of the legal ramifications of this concept, communication, which is considered 
privileged, is often conceptualized as “testimonial privilege” (Thomas, & Herbert, 2005; Weiner 
& Wettstein, 1993). However, some lawsuits involving negligence related to the failure to warn 
or protect a third-party have been complicated by the plaintiff  raising the issue of privilege 
during the court proceedings or therapists being a witness against their own client (Aversa & 
Kapoor, 2011; Glancy & Chaimowitz, 2005; Weinstock, Leong, & Silva, 2001). This dilemma is 
especially relevant since the federal courts recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege and a 
dangerous patient exception in Jaffee v. Redmond (1983).The duty to warn has essentially 
evolved into an exception to both psychotherapist-patient privilege and the ethical standard of 
confidentiality.  Therefore, the legal exception has become the ethical exception (Weiner & 
Wettstein, 1993; Weinstock et al., 2001). 
  The ethical and legal conflicts brought forth from Tarasoff decisions were complex 
because they involved balancing multiple ethical principles and legal mandates. Because 
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therapists operate within parameters of conditional confidentiality, the cumbersome imposition 
of duties toward third-parties forced clinicians to, not only to evaluate the clinical presentation of 
their clients’ risky behaviors, but to evaluate the impact of those risks upon society as a whole 
(Knapp, et al., 2007; Knapp, & Sturm, 2002).  Furthermore, because these duties may be 
mandatory, the therapist may have no choice but to breach confidentiality and warn a threat to 
third-party or law enforcement about threats verbalized during a therapy session. 
 The traditional underpinnings of most professional codes of ethics included autonomy, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence, fidelity, and justice (Kitchner, 1984). Issues of autonomy have 
often been attenuated under Tarasoff-related scenarios because, once a threat is verbalized, the 
client may have no other option but to face the potential legal and personal consequences of a 
therapist relaying a warning to a third-party. Felthous & Kachigian (2001) argue, convincingly, 
that one legal interpretation is that the act of uttering a threat in the first place represents a 
criminal act. The therapist has been a witness to a crime which conflicts with issues of 
beneficence and nonmaleficence which were arguably at the heart of the Tarasoff duties because 
the duty to protect a potential victim outweighs the duty the clinician has to maintain 
confidentiality (Knapp et al. 2007). Although some have argued in favor of the right of 
unconditional confidentiality (Kipnis, 2006; Miller & Thelen, 1986), the prevailing professional 
standards for both counselors and psychologists reflect the concept of conditional confidentiality 
because legal mandates have weakened the client’s expectation of confidentiality (Thelen, 
Rodriquez, & Sprengelmeyer, 1994; Weinstock et al., 2001). Fidelity has also been relevant to 
the extent that therapists must balance a set of duties that involve those to their clients and those 
to the potential victim of a threat of violence. Finally, concepts of justice and what is fair have 
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also been part of the decision-making process for therapists confronted with the duty to warn 
(Kitchner, 1984). 
Risk management is a component of the analysis a therapist must complete in situations 
involving potential duties to third-parties (Monahan, 1993). The fear of litigation and the 
uneasiness of violating ethical principles have shaped the manner in which clinicians manage 
these high-risk situations (Knapp et al., 2007; Knoll & Gerbasi, 2006; VandeCreek, & Knapp, 
2000). Therapists who fail to warn targeted third-parties who are subsequently injured or killed 
are subject to malpractice litigation based upon negligence claims. Negligence may occur when 
professional conduct falls below an established standard which impacts the safety and protection 
of others from unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm or damage (Knoll & Gerbasi, 2006; 
Packman, Cabot, & Bongar, 1994; Weiner & Wettstein, 1993). Negligence claims are generally 
conceptualized as unintentional torts and, in the area of healthcare, malpractice is negligence 
related to failure in carrying out professional duties (Gutheil, Simon, & Hilliard, 2005; Marks, 
1977). 
  In a malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a duty to the 
plaintiff and that there was a breach of duty which caused damages. Furthermore, those damages 
must be caused by the breach of duty (Knoll & Gerbasi, 2006; Slovenko, 1999; VandeCreek, et 
al., 1987; Weiner & Wettstein, 1993). Practitioners have been judged by standards established by 
their specialty. In cases of malpractice claims, the behavior of the practitioner  has been 
evaluated  on the skills, knowledge, and experience ordinarily possessed and used by similarly 
trained professionals, acting under similar circumstances and practicing in the same locale as in 
Robbins v. Footer, (1977). 
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Thus, therapists may be held liable for harm resulting for failure to issue a warning to 
potential victim (Felthous, 1987) or be held liable for defamation resulting from breaches in 
confidentiality as was the case in Garner v. Stone (1999). 
Under principles of common law, no one has a duty to protect another individual from 
harm unless there is a special relationship between the parties (Monahan, 2007; Prosser, 1971; 
Slovenko, 2006; Slovenko, 1999). However, the basis of the duty to warn or protect third-parties, 
as reasoned by the original Tarasoff court cases, was based upon the existence of a special 
relationship between the psychotherapist and the patient. Essentially, the special relationship 
found in the confidential relationship between a therapist and patient constitutes the basis of an 
exception to the common law principle regarding the absence of a duty to control the conduct of 
another person so as to prevent harm  (Slovenko, 1999). Thus, in Tarasoff, the presence of the 
special relationship between therapist and client gave rise to the duty to a third-party when there 
was a verbal threat toward an identifiable, or reasonably identifiable, third-party (Slovenko, 
2006; Slovenko, 1999). 
Aftermath of Tarasoff and State Responses 
In its first Tarasoff decision, the Supreme Court of California articulated a 
psychotherapist’s duty to warn a third-party of potential violence by a client. The court 
essentially said that when psychotherapists, exercising their professional judgment, determine or 
should determine, that a warning to a third-party might prevent harm, those professionals have a 
legal duty to issue that warning (Felthous & Kachigian, 2001). In its rehearing of the case in 
1976, the California Supreme Court vacated the first decision and articulated a set of duties to 
protect third-parties. The court indicated that once a therapist determines or should have 
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determined the patient represents a serious threat to a third-party, the therapists have an 
obligation to utilize “reasonable care to protect" the intended victim (Tarasoff, 1976, p.340). 
There were no indications from the court about how to make the determination of dangerousness 
and there was also no requirement of a verbal threat or requirement to obviate the threat through 
additional clinical intervention or intensification of therapy. Felthous and Kachigian (2001) 
argued that following these decisions, courts and state legislatures began to distinguish between 
the duties to warn and the duties to protect or control. In subsequent Tarasoff-related cases, 
courts would either separate the two duties or sometimes only deal with one aspect of one of the 
articulated duties. Furthermore, both court systems and state legislatures began to deal with the 
Tarasoff-related duties in their various permutations, as well as the issue of foreseeability of risks 
and the ability to accurately identify potential targets. In tort litigation, foreseeability is a 
component of the analysis of negligence. 
Following the promulgation of the 1976 Tarasoff decision, many professionals and 
commentators expressed grave concerns about the impact of these decisions upon the practice of 
psychology and psychiatry (Stone, 1976; Rosenhan, Teitelbaum, Teitelbaum, & Davidson, 1987; 
Roth & Meisel, 1977). Many were concerned that the threat of disclosures to a third-party would 
endanger the long tradition of psychotherapist-patient confidentiality and dramatically affect the 
efficacy of psychotherapy (Small, 1985; Quinn, 1984).Others have concluded that the duties are 
not as onerous as initially conceived (Walcott, Cerundolo, & Beck, 2001). 
After Tarasoff, other jurisdictions began to reference the landmark California case in 
their reasoning of cases involving allegations of negligence on the part of therapists for failure to 
protect victims. These judicial findings, in other states, were often rendered in the absence of 
state statutes addressing these types of duties for mental health professionals. Most jurisdictions 
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subsequently began to establish statutes articulating the obligations mental-health professionals 
may have to third-parties, who are potential victims based on the seriousness of a threat from 
client (Kaufman, 1991). 
At the current time, there are jurisdictions that permit, but do not mandate, 
psychotherapists to disclose warnings to third-parties based upon their assessment of risk and 
include West Virginia, Florida, New York, Oregon and the District of Columbia. There are other 
jurisdictions that impose an affirmative duty by statute to warn or protect potential victims and 
another nine states that have common-law duties to warn and protect based on court cases 
(Harmon, 2008; Melby, 2004). Other states that have either not ruled on the issue of duty to 
third-parties or have no statute (Pabian, et al., 2009). 
There is tremendous variability with respect to state statutes regarding duty to third-
parties and there is no precise consensus about the classification of the jurisdictions (Benjamin, 
Kent, & Sirikantraporn, 2009; Herbert & Young, 2002; Knapp, VandeCreek, & Shapiro, 1990; 
Pabian, et al., 2009). For example, the states of Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey 
require a therapist not only to warn of explicit verbal threats made by the patient, but also 
mandate that the therapist consider the patient's history of violence in the process of assessment 
of duties. In Ohio, Minnesota, and California, therapists are also obligated to issue warnings 
based upon information reported by third-parties (Herbert & Young, 2002).  These decisions 
were clearly the effect of the Ewing cases upon state legislatures. Other confusions and 
inconsistencies come from issues related to the types of disciplines covered within the statute. 
For example, Oklahoma statutes impose specific liability only on psychologists and leave the 
status of other professionals vague. The state of Michigan includes music therapists in their duty 
to warn statute (Herbert & Young, 2002) whereas the statutes of South Dakota appear to be 
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contradictory in terms of who receives a warning. For example, in one section of the code the 
warning should be issued to both law enforcement and the victim, and in another section of the 
code it is law enforcement or victim. 
Among the permissive states, Oregon's statute, although providing immunity for not 
disclosing information is problematic in that the statute applies only to providers with public 
mental health agencies and their staff (Bloom & Rogers, 1988). This ambiguity leaves open the 
question of its relevance for private practitioners. In North Carolina, its statute appears to only 
apply to non-private practitioners. The Texas statute does permit disclosure to law enforcement 
agencies of threats but does not permit or require those warnings be issued to the victim (Barbee, 
Ekleberry & Villalobos, 2007). Herbert & Young (2002) caution that some of the permissive 
statutes, including Florida and West Virginia, may be susceptible to a subsequent duty being 
attached by judicial interpretation. They specifically caution practitioners in these jurisdictions to 
consider approaching the permissive language as more mandatory in clinical practice. Soulier, 
Maislen, & Beck (2010) concluded that states with permissive statutes actual experience more 
practitioner liability than states which have more mandatory language.   
In one study, Kachigian & Felthous (2004) evaluated how various court systems across 
the country have utilized and referenced  various appropriate state statutes regarding Tarasoff-
related duties and corresponding immunities. They reviewed 76 court cases to evaluate the extent 
to which the rendered opinions included references to the relevant state statutes and whether or 
not the analysis did or did not create a duty for the therapists. Of the 76 cases evaluated, 21 of 
those cases did not include judicial references to the state statute, despite their likely relevance. 
In some instances, there was no indication by the court as to why the statute was not referenced. 
Further, the researchers found 12 cases in which the court referenced the appropriate state 
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statute, but did not use it in their analyses. In some instances, the lawsuits may have predated the 
ratification of the statute or, as they found in one case, the Michigan state statute applies to 
mental-health professionals and the defendant in the case reviewed was a mental-health facility. 
Thus, the efforts of state legislatures to enact reasonable statutory remedies to the Tarasoff-
related court cases only punctuated the inconsistencies across jurisdictions and even within the 
same jurisdiction. 
Selected Court Cases 
Even prior to the Tarasoff cases, courts acknowledged duties to third-parties primarily 
based on negligent inpatient releases. In Fair v. United States (1959), an Air Force officer 
threatened to kill several people at his duty station including the commander, a student nurse, 
and several other medical personnel. The nursing school hired a guard to protect the student 
nurse and eventually the officer was hospitalized. During his hospitalization, the attending 
physicians assured the student nurse that she would be notified before the officer was discharged 
from the hospital. The officer was released and the physicians failed to notify the nurse or other 
personnel. Following his release from the hospital, he killed a student nurse, two other staff, and 
then himself. The hospital was found negligent regarding the officer's release. In a similar case in 
1966, Underwood v. United States, a soldier, who had a history of stalking and threatening his 
ex-wife, was admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Alabama. The two treating physicians did not 
adequately document interventions and they did not thoroughly communicate with one another 
regarding the patient's violent history. The second treating physician released the soldier and 
placed him on restricted duty on the base. After his discharge, the soldier obtained a military 
weapon, shot and killed his wife and then himself. The Court of Appeals found negligence on the 
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part of the first treating physician, as well as the staff who maintained control of the weapons on 
the base. 
One of the issues confronting therapists in dealing with Tarasoff-related cases when 
contemplating issuing a warning is the extent to which the threat is already known to the 
potential victim. Such was the case in Bradley Center v. Wessmer (1982), in which a man 
voluntarily admitted himself to a psychiatric treatment facility for symptoms of depression and 
anger toward his wife, in part, because she was having an affair and planned to divorce the 
patient. During Wessmer’s treatment, he was given a pass in order to visit with his children. 
During his time away from the treatment center, he purchased a gun, confronted his wife and her 
lover and shot them both. The Georgia court held that the act was foreseeable and that the 
negligence of the Center was the cause of her death. Although the wife had prior knowledge of 
the threats, the treatment facility was aware that he had made threats during his stay at the 
psychiatric unit and they could have declined his request for leave. The victim's prior knowledge 
was part of the court's reasoning in the state of Iowa In the Matter of the Estate of Votteler 
(1982). A former outpatient of Dr.Votteler intentionally struck and killed the plaintiff while 
driving an automobile. The patient had, in the past, twice attempted to run her and the patient's 
husband down with her automobile and therefore the risk was known to the victim. The court 
found that there was no duty to protect third-parties when the foreseeable victim had prior 
knowledge of the threat from the patient. In Boulanger v. Pol (1995), a traumatic brain-injured 
male was released from a treatment facility back to the care of his uncle. The patient assaulted 
the plaintiff and he sued the defendant for negligent release. The court said that there was no 
special relationship existing in this case bringing about any duty and, finally, the duty to warn 
does not arise when the victim has prior knowledge of the danger. 
18 
 
  Some courts have found liability for outpatient providers. In this case from Oregon, 
Cain v. Rijken, (1986), a psychiatric patient had been released from a hospital on the condition 
that he attends a day treatment program. During his treatment in this less intensive level of care, 
his symptoms began to worsen and he experienced hallucinations. He did not show up for his 
therapy appointment and two days later, while driving his car erratically, he collided with 
another car killing the driver. The Supreme Court held that the day treatment program had a duty 
to monitor the patient and remanded the case back to the lower court.  
In Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., et al. (2000), the plaintiff was admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital for suicidal thoughts and exacerbation bipolar disorder-related symptoms. 
The defendant claimed that the staff permitted a male patient, believed to be HIV-positive, to 
enter her room and remain there without supervision. She indicated that she was sexually 
assaulted by this male patient. The defendants pled that they owed no duty to protect the plaintiff 
from criminal attacks because there was no special relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant. Furthermore, the defendant maintained that the sexual assault was not foreseeable. 
The trial judge rendered summary judgment for the defendants. The Virginia Supreme Court 
rejected the lower court ruling and found that there was a special relationship, creating a duty, 
between a psychiatric patient and a psychiatric facility. At that time, Virginia had no Tarasoff 
duty.   
 In one instance, the court extended liability to an eyewitness. In this California case, 
Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County (1983), a psychologist and a psychological 
assistant were providing therapy to a couple. The man threatened the woman and both therapists 
warned her of the threats. Eventually, he acted upon those threats and ran the woman and her son 
off the road in her car and then shot her. She sued the therapist claiming that they had not warned 
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her of the danger to her or her son and she further claimed that her son was traumatized by 
witnessing this violence. The Supreme Court of California held that the therapist did, in fact, 
have duties to both the woman and her son because the injuries were, in their opinion, 
foreseeable because children are generally in close proximity to their parents. Therefore, liability 
extends to bystanders. 
The essence of most Tarasoff statutes includes a verbalized threat and a foreseeable 
victim. These were not the circumstances in the case of Jablonski v. United States (1983). In this 
case, Jablonski had a history of sexual assault and homicidal ideation directed at both his 
girlfriend and her mother. He had sought psychiatric treatment at a California Veterans 
Administration hospital for reoccurring thoughts of violence toward his girlfriend and her 
mother. His therapist at the Veterans Administration facility concluded that Jablonski may be 
potentially dangerous. One of his therapists even suggested that his girlfriend get out of the 
relationship for her own safety. She continued to maintain contact with him and the therapist 
gave her no further warnings. The treatment team did not feel that involuntary commitment was 
indicated.  The team was unaware of Jablonski's long history of violence toward his ex-wife 
because they had failed to request previous medical records. Shortly after Jablonski's release 
from the hospital, he killed his girlfriend. This case essentially expanded the legal concept of 
foreseeability, as there was no specific verbal threat directed at the victim during his 
hospitalization and she had been warned about his behavior and advised to leave the relationship. 
The court reasoned that his lengthy history of violent behavior, absent a specific verbal threat 
directed at a particular victim, was sufficient evidence of reasonable foreseeability.  
This expansion of foreseeability, directed toward a potential class of victims rather an 
identified target, was also seen in Arizona case, Hamman v. County of Maricopa (1989) where 
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the court outlined a zone of danger containing possible victims. Likewise, in Lipari v. Sears, 
Roebuck and Co. (1980), considered by many to be the broadest interpretation of Tarasoff duties, 
a patient of a local Veterans Administration Hospital purchased a shotgun at Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., while he was in a day treatment program. He never advised any of the treatment team 
members that he purchased firearms. He withdrew from treatment approximately three weeks 
after he purchased the shotgun. Approximately four weeks after that, he entered a nightclub and 
began shooting randomly, injuring a woman and killing her husband. The injured widow filed a 
wrongful death suit against Sears for selling firearms to someone they should have known had 
serious psychiatric problems. The Nebraska court rejected the Tarasoff limitation of an identified 
victim and extended the legal duty to foreseeable victims or a class of victims, even in cases in 
which there were no verbal threats. The courts concluded in the Schuster v. Altenberg (1989) 
case that a duty to protect exists and that the therapist was potentially liable for any harm that 
occurs to third-parties regardless of the issue of foreseeability. 
 The issues of foreseeability and frequency of patient contact were the focus in Naidu v. 
Laird (1988). The patient in Naidu v. Laird (1988) had a lengthy history of multiple psychiatric 
inpatient admissions based upon a history of medication noncompliance, deliberate automobile 
accidents, and multiple suicide attempts. During the hospital stay in question, he was there on a 
voluntary basis and ceased taking his medication upon discharge. Five months later, he 
intentionally drove his vehicle into a vehicle driven by the plaintiff, resulting in a homicide. The 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict and ruled that the psychiatrist had been 
negligent in his evaluation and release of the patient. In this case, there was also no specific 
threat or no readily identifiable victim. Plus, there was a five-month delay between the time of 
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discharge and the time of the vehicular homicide, which might have impacted the causality 
component necessary to establish negligence. 
Driving cases have been part of the duty to warn literature.  In Peterson v. State (1983), 
the patient was committed to a state hospital involuntarily and was known to have a history of 
erratic behavior and a lengthy history of substance abuse. During his stay in the hospital, he was 
noncompliant with his medication. Five days after his discharge from the hospital, the patient 
was driving recklessly and caused an automobile accident which resulted in injuries to the 
plaintiff. The court found the attending psychiatrist negligent in his release of the patient and for 
failure to seek further involuntary commitment proceedings. The court also held that the 
physician had a duty to protect anyone who may potentially be foreseeably in danger by the 
former patient’s substance-abuse. In this case, there was obviously no verbal threat and no 
identifiable potential target of a threat. 
Many states and jurisdictions have refused to impose a duty on therapists.  Among them 
is Florida, as evident by the Florida Court of Appeals in Boynton v. Burglass (1991). In this case, 
Lawrence Blalock was under the care of the defendant when he shot and killed Wayne Boynton. 
The plaintiff's family sued the psychiatrist, alleging that the doctor either knew or should have 
known that his patient had threatened serious harm to the decedent and failed to warn the 
decedent or notify the police of the alleged threats of harm. The court refused to apply the 
Tarasoff reasoning in this case. The court indicated that predicting and controlling the behavior 
of patients are unreasonable goals and that psychiatry was not an exact science. The Florida court 
further stated that the court in the original Tarasoff decision, misunderstood the special 
relationship exception to the rule that there are generally no duties to control the conduct of 
another person. Finally, the Boynton v. Burglass court concluded that because the therapeutic 
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relationship between Blalock and his therapist contained no element of control that it failed to 
meet the special relationship exception to the common law rule. 
The special relationship concept was also rejected by the Virginia Superior Court in 
Nasser v. Parker (1995). In this case, a patient with a history of violence toward women 
threatened to kill his ex-girlfriend for apparently rejecting him. He voluntarily sought 
hospitalization and remained there for one day and signed himself out against medical advice. 
The attending psychiatrist did not warn the girlfriend even though he was aware of the recent 
threat. Approximately six days later, the patient shot and killed his girlfriend. The plaintiff 
alleged that there was a special relationship between the doctor and the patient and that the 
relationship would carry a duty to prevent physical harm to others. The court rejected the duty to 
warn concept and stated that a voluntary, patient-physician relationship is insufficient to create a 
duty, despite the fact that the patient had been hospitalized. 
The Texas case Thapar v. Zezulka (1999) was appealed twice before it was finally heard 
by the Texas Supreme Court. For three years, a psychiatrist had been treating a patient with a 
diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder, paranoia, and delusional thinking. He had at least six 
hospitalizations under the doctor's care and during his last admission, he disclosed to his 
physician that he felt like killing his stepfather. The doctor did not issue any warning to the 
stepfather or notify the police about the threat. Approximately one month after his release from 
the hospital, the patient killed his stepfather. The patient's mother sued the psychiatrist for 
negligent care and failing to warn the patient's stepfather of the verbal threats. The Supreme 
Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant psychiatrist, indicating that therapists do 
not have a duty to third-parties for negligent diagnosis or treatment. Furthermore, the court 
referenced the Texas state statute regarding patient confidentiality, which includes an exception 
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for therapists to disclose threats made by patients only to law enforcement but not to potential 
victims. The court indicated that such a proposed disclosure of the threat to the potential victim 
would have violated the state statute. Finally, the court reasoned that psychotherapists who issue 
warnings to third-parties may not be immune from liability resulting from those disclosures 
regardless of whether or not they are made in good faith.  
The Ohio court expanded the duties to warn and protect regardless of prior knowledge or 
specified victim in Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center (1997). In 1991, 
Matt Morgan was having dinner with his family when he excused himself, returned and then shot 
and killed his parents. He seriously wounded his sister. In the year prior to that, Matt had been 
receiving treatment at Fairfield Family Counseling Center (FFCC). In January, 1990, after 
making threats toward his father, the authorities removed Matt from his parent’s home in Ohio. 
He drifted for several months and subsequently was admitted to a psychiatric hospital in 
Pennsylvania. He was successfully treated with antipsychotic medications and diagnosed with 
schizophreniform disorder. Matt was discharged to the care of his family in Ohio and scheduled 
follow-up care locally.  Dr. Brown, the psychiatrist consultant to FFCC, performed a half hour 
evaluation and continued the patient’s medication, but then discontinued the medication a few 
months later.  Apparently, he never familiarized himself with the treatment Matt received in the 
Pennsylvania hospital. Matt continued a therapeutic relationship with a vocational counselor at 
FFCC. Throughout his treatment, Matt’s mother repeatedly shared with staff that she feared his 
mental state was worsening. She continued to express concerns that her son had become verbally 
abusive and threatening. Having heard her concerns, Matt’s counselor indicated to Mrs. Morgan 
that Matt was not committable. In May 1991, Matt did not show up for a scheduled appointment. 
At the end of May, the counselor assessed Matt on an emergency basis and again concluded he 
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was not a candidate for involuntary hospitalization.  Mr. and Mrs. Morgan wrote to the 
counselor’s supervisor with yet another plea for help. They were informed on July 25, 1991, that 
the agency was not able to assist and could not recommend commitment.  Later that day, Mr. and 
Mrs. Morgan were shot and killed by their son. The estate of the decedents sued the center for 
negligence.  The Ohio court in a sweeping decision concluded that the defendants were negligent 
and that there was no immunity from civil prosecution except in civil commitment proceedings. 
They further stated that it was the duty of mental health professionals to curtail violence directed 
at the community at large. The Ohio legislature, following pressure from professional 
organizations, enacted a statute which was specifically aimed at curtailing the extensions of 
duties found in this particular ruling (Mossman, 2004).  
  The Vermont courts expanded the duty to include threats to property. In Peck v. 
Counseling Service of Addison County (1985), the courts of Vermont expanded the Tarasoff 
duties to include threats to property. John Peck set fire to the plaintiffs’ barn. At the time, John 
was receiving outpatient services and was living at home with his parents. He had had an 
argument with his father and his immediately left home and went directly to the Counseling 
Service. 
 Upon arrival, John told his therapist that he had a fight with his father and that he did not 
feel that his father loved or respected him.  His therapist arranged for John to stay with his 
grandparents and scheduled a session for the next day. John was still angry with his father during 
that meeting. During the next session, John asked if he could continue to talk about his thoughts 
and feelings about his father and admitted that he wanted to get back at his father. In response to 
the therapist’s follow-up question on how he would get back at his father, he said that he could 
burn down the family barn. After discussion of the consequences of that decision, John promised 
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his therapist that he would not burn down his father’s barn. The therapist did not inform his 
parents or anyone on the Counseling Service staff. 
Peck subsequently did set fire to his family's barn and his family sued the counselor and 
the facility which had provided his care. The court was particularly critical of his therapist for 
failing to advise his family of the threat and also her failure to consult with her supervisors and 
obtain his previous records from other providers. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and 
found a duty to warn potential victims and protect property in cases of arson. 
  In a case in West Virginia, Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., (1991), a 
patient was brought to West Virginia University Hospital on June 2, 1988. Loftus Johnson was a 
security police officer on duty that night. When conscious, the patient became combative, unruly, 
and used obscene language. Seven doctors and nurses were present while they were treating the 
patient in the emergency room. The patient let it be known at this time that he was infected with 
HIV. The guard was called to the scene when the patient continued his uncontrollable, unruly 
behavior. The police officer initially only watched over the scene but he tried to help when the 
patient’s bed fell over and the medical staff needed help restraining the patient. While lifting the 
patient back into his bed, the guard was bit by the patient in his forearm. He was notified by a 
paramedic, after the bite, that the patient was, in fact, HIV positive. Johnson sued West Virginia 
University Hospital for damages related to failing to warn him of the risks.  The Supreme Court 
of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict for damage related to exposure to HIV. 
In Ewing v. Goldstein (2004), the court expanded the threats to include those delivered by 
a concerned third party. Dr. David Goldstein, the defendant and a family and marriage therapist, 
provided counseling services to Geno Colello between 1997 and 2001. Colello, a former Los 
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Angeles Police Department employee, was being treated for work-related problems and personal 
issues with his ex-girlfriend, Diana Williams. He became noticeably more depressed after the 
ending of his relationship with Williams in early 2001. In mid-June, he became increasingly 
depressed after learning that Williams was seeing someone else. June 19, 2001 was the last 
meeting between Goldstein and Colello in the doctor’s office. They communicated via telephone 
on both June 20th and June 21st. When Goldstein asked Colello if he was feeling suicidal, he 
responded that “he was not blatantly suicidal, but did admit to thinking about it.” Goldstein 
asked Colello to think about checking himself into a psychiatric hospital. He also asked Colello 
for his permission to contact his father, Victor Colello. Geno had dinner with his parents on June 
21st and was still apparently depressed. He told his father that he lost reasons to live and that he 
resented Williams’ new boyfriend. He also told his father that he was thinking of harming 
Williams’ new boyfriend. Colello’s father, Victor, contacted Goldstein and told him what Geno 
had told him. Goldstein told Victor to take his son to Northridge Hospital Medical Center. He 
had arranged for Colello to receive psychiatric care there and he was voluntary admitted under 
the care of Dr. Gary Levinson, a staff psychiatrist. The next day, Levinson told Colello’s father 
he was planning on discharging Geno. Believing his son was being released prematurely, Victor 
called Goldstein who, in turn, contacted Levinson and told him why Colello should remain 
hospitalized. Levinson told him that Colello was not suicidal and he would be discharged. 
Goldstein urged him to reconsider, reevaluate Colello, and keep him through the weekend. Geno 
was discharged on June 22nd
 
and Goldstein had no additional contact with him. The next day, 
June 23rd, Geno Colello murdered Williams’ boyfriend, Keith Ewing, and then killed himself. 
Mr. Ewing's family sued Dr. Goldstein, for negligence resulting in wrongful death and 
subsequently, the inpatient facility and the attending psychiatrist treated the patient (Ewing v. 
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Northridge Hospital and Medical Center, 2004). The allegation of negligence was based on 
Goldstein's failure to warn Ewing of a threat toward a victim by means of a phone call from his 
patient's father. These allegations were part of the lawsuit despite the fact that Goldstein had 
arranged for inpatient treatment and did attempt to increase the duration of stay in the inpatient 
facility. Upon appeal, the California Court of Appeals overturned the decision to dismiss and 
held that Goldstein may be potentially negligent. As part of their decision, the court 
misinterpreted the meaning of the applicable statute (Weinstock, Vari, Leong, & Silva 2006). 
Specifically, the court’s interpretation of the code implied that a warning was necessary to 
discharge the statutory duty to protect, despite the fact that the second Tarasoff decision vacated 
the first decision that had mandated warnings to third parties. Even though by some analyses, he 
discharged the duty as Goldstein had taken reasonable action to hospital his patient. Furthermore, 
the attorneys for the defense did not object to the court's analysis or raise the issue (Weinstock, et 
al., 2006). 
The significance of the Ewing decision was based upon several findings. First, the court 
found that the communication of a threat by means of a family member is the clinical and legal 
equivalent of a threat made by a patient. In Morgan, there were similar concerns from family 
members expressed to the primary therapist but they were not construed by the court as 
equivalent to patient threats known to the family and the agency. Second, the Ewing court found 
that the duty was also contingent upon the therapist being convinced of the validity of the threat. 
If the therapist, in this instant case, did not feel that the information were credible, then there 
would be no duty. Furthermore, the duty may have actually existed beyond the subsequent 
recommendations of the second provider who determined the patient not to be dangerous 
implying that the duty to warn was generated by the first therapist’s determination of 
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dangerousness and may have extended beyond the inpatient assessments (Weinstock, et al., 
2006).  
The family also litigated the mental health facility in which the patient was admitted and 
treated (Smith, 2006). The family alleged that the admitting psychotherapist was also aware of 
the threats to kill their son but did not warn law enforcement or the victim. The attending 
physician had settled out of court. Furthermore, they indicated that the threat of the patient, 
ultimately communicated to the therapist by the patient's father, should still be considered patient 
communication (Weinstock, et al., 2006). The court reversed the lower court decision. The 
implications of this case are discussed below. 
In Georgia, the case of Garner v. Stone (1999) represents much of the competing interests 
that define duties to third-parties in a context of the ethical and legal implications of conditional 
confidentiality. Garner had been a police officer for 30 years and began experiencing job-related 
stress in the summer of 1995. He began seeing a psychologist and reported having feelings of 
anger, struggles at work, and suicidal thoughts. Garner was referred to Dr. Stein for evaluation 
regarding fitness for duty as a police officer.  
Following an argument with a supervisor Garner told Stone that he had violent fantasies 
about killing a supervisor and other members of the Police Department. Stone found Garner unfit 
for duty and it was recommended that he be placed on a 30 day leave of absence. Stone did not 
warn Garner's supervisor about the fantasies and felt that there was no imminent danger. Two 
weeks passed and Stone did not re-evaluate him but he did consult with the previous psychiatrist 
and together they placed a telephone call to an attorney associated with the Georgia 
Psychological Association, who told Stone there was a duty to warn the targets of the verbal 
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threats. Stone notified Garner’s supervisors about the fantasies. Garner was then placed on 
administrative leave and reassigned to work at a local animal shelter. He complained about the 
reassignment to his superiors and he was subsequently fired for insubordination. Garner sued Dr. 
Stone for malpractice including negligence and defamation based upon the unjustified issuance 
of the warnings. The jury trial found in Garner's favor and there was no appeal. 
At that time in Georgia, there was case law establishing legal precedent for the duty to 
protect but there was no statutory duty to warn potential victims. Furthermore, there was also no 
statutory immunity for therapists issuing such warnings to third-parties. Therefore, therapists 
who would have issued valid warnings to third-parties had exposure to liability for damages 
related to breaching confidentiality. 
Tarasoff  Surveys 
Despite the significance of the Tarasoff duties, there have been very few surveys which 
target either therapist’s knowledge of Tarasoff-related duties or the impact of duty to warn court 
cases or state statutes. Wise (1978) surveyed nearly 1,200 California psychiatrists and 
psychologists regarding their experiences with high-risk patients and duties to third-parties. She 
found that 80% of her sample acknowledged treating at least one dangerous patient during the 
year preceding the survey. Of the participants, 49% of them had issued a warning to a potential 
victim prior to the Tarsoff decisions. Thirty-seven percent said they issued a warning in the year 
following the decision. Of those who had issued warnings, 31% of them warned a family 
member, while 16% notified potential victims, and 17% notified law enforcement. Most 
therapists in her survey indicated they had increased the frequency of consultation with peers, 
especially when dealing with risky patients.  In addition, their record-keeping skills improved. 
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Most participants indicated their threshold for determining dangerousness was lower than 
previous years. They also reported an increase in the frequency of victim notifications they were 
issuing, as a result of the Tarasoff decisions. Finally, most respondents acknowledged that prior 
to the Tarasoff decisions they often issued verbal warnings to potential victims without a judicial 
mandate or internal ethical conflicts. 
Givelber, Bowers, & Blitch (1984) sampled 2,875 psychiatrists, psychologists, and social 
workers in eight cities regarding how Tarasoff-related duties had impacted their practice. Most of 
the respondents believed there were means other than issuing a warning to the potential victim 
for complying with their ethical obligations to third-parties. The researchers also found that 75% 
of the participants incorrectly believed the Tarasoff duty required them to warn victims, rather 
than exercise due care in order to protect them from violence. Most of the clinicians in the survey 
also revealed they were more likely to communicate threats to public authorities rather than the 
potential targets. The researchers felt that this finding may be due to availability of law 
enforcement and difficulty locating potential victims. Those in private practice were more likely 
to issue a warning to potential victims and less likely to initiate involuntary commitment than 
their peers who work in institutional settings. Like the Wise (1978) study, these researchers also 
reported there were a significant number of clinicians who reported that prior to the Tarasoff 
decisions they, in fact, breached confidentiality in situations involving patient threats. 
In one study, McNiel, Binder, & Fulton (1998) evaluated the manner in which therapists 
had given notifications and begun a voluntary commitment proceedings based on California's 
statute regarding Tarasoff-related duties. They evaluated involuntary civil commitment data from 
the greater San Francisco area by reviewing county health records. They also reviewed all duty 
to protect notifications, which were received by the San Francisco Police Department between 
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1986 and 1990. Of the total 337 clients, who made threats resulting in notifications, 
approximately half of them were subjected to civil commitment proceedings. This number of 
patients, whose threatening behaviors lead to duty to protect action, represented a small 
proportion of the total number of patients in that area, which were subject to emergency 
commitment proceedings. For example, researchers reported that in 1988, there were 3,777 
patients who were the subject of involuntary commitment proceedings because they were 
considered to be dangerous.  Another 890 individuals were referred for extended involuntary 
inpatient treatment. Yet, during that same year, there were only 81 Tarasoff-related notifications 
recorded by the local police department.  
Their research also found that approximately 65% of the notifications made within a two-
year time period were made by counselors, social workers, and nursing staff. Nearly 25% of the 
notifications were placed by psychiatrists and only 1% by psychologists. Furthermore, their data 
indicated that most of the notifications were made by staff from psychiatric hospitals, while only 
approximately 10% came from outpatient-based services. Most of the intended victims of the 
verbal threats were female and were most likely to be a family member or a significant other of 
the patient. They concluded that, for the most part, psychotherapists were either ignoring their 
statutory duties or they were utilizing other ways of protecting potential victims.  This study is 
important because it indicates that even in jurisdictions which have been on the forefront of 
issuing and codifying Tarasoff-related duties, the therapists and professionals in that jurisdiction 
exhibit a lack of understanding of existing statutory duties and may be utilizing the involuntary 
commitment process absent any type of notification. 
In another study by Binder & McNiel (1996), the researchers were interested in the fact 
of Tarasoff-related warnings on the intended victim as well as the therapeutic relationship with 
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the patient. They surveyed 46 psychiatric residents at a university-based psychiatric training 
program in San Francisco. They were asked about their experiences regarding Tarasoff warnings 
and approximately half of them reported having issued a Tarasoff warning. This particular 
finding is consistent with the Wise (1978) study in which she found half of the clinicians had 
issued a warning in the previous year. The residents reported they were unable to reach the 
intended victim in half the cases and in most cases they reported the threat to local law 
enforcement.  In cases in which the intended victim was reached, approximately 75% of the time, 
the intended victims were already aware of the threat.  Most of the intended victims were 
grateful for the warning from the residents and indicated they planned to change their behaviors 
in such a way as to increase their personal safety. Other intended victims expressed denial and 
minimized the legitimacy of the threat directed at them. Finally, the physicians indicated that the 
issuance of the warning to the third-parties had either a minimal or overall positive effect on the 
therapeutic relationship. These findings are similar to the Beck (1985) study, in which he 
concluded that the issuance of the Tarasoff-related duties should be part of the overall clinical 
process and that involving the patient in the notification process can actually build the 
therapeutic alliance. Roth & Meisel (1977) reached a similar conclusion about client 
involvement in the notification. 
Many statutory requirements mandate some form of notification to law enforcement in 
the execution of discharging the duties to third-parties. One survey described the experiences 
police stations in two states had regarding their experiences with Tarasoff-related warnings 
(Huber, Balon, Labbate, Brandt-Youtz, Hammer & Mufti, 2000).  They surveyed, by telephone, 
50 police stations in Michigan and 54 stations in South Carolina using a standardized 
questionnaire. Approximately 53% of the desk sergeants interviewed reported that the station 
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had never received any such warnings. Roughly 24% reported that the station had a specific 
policy regarding warnings from therapists while only 3% of the officers interviewed were 
familiar with the Tarasoff court cases. The majority of the desk staff indicated they would record 
and pass on warnings received from therapists regarding potential victims. Police stations in rural 
areas reported fewer experiences with Tarasoff-related warnings than stations located in urban 
areas. The limited experience by police stations with Tarasoff warnings is consistent with 
findings from McNiel and Binder (1998) in which they observed many clinicians prefer to 
hospitalize patients rather than make notifications. The significance of this study is that many 
statutes have notification requirements for local law enforcement. It appears from these data that 
the reporting of these warnings to police stations is relatively infrequent. Therefore, police 
officers in the stations have minimal experience with managing these kinds of threats. These 
findings imply that clinicians are using other means for dealing with high risk clients.  
  Pabian, et al., (2009) surveyed psychologists in Michigan, Ohio, New York, and Texas 
to evaluate their understanding of their particular state’s statutory approach to Tarasoff-related 
duties, including the conditions that trigger the duties and, if applicable, the means by which the 
duties may be discharged. Furthermore, the researchers were also interested in the extent to 
which continuing education impacts the understanding of state codes. Texas and Ohio mandate 
continuing education hours in ethics while New York and Michigan have no such requirements 
(APA, 2006). Ohio and Michigan are considered duty to protect states, whereas Texas and New 
York have no legal duty to protect although they permit disclosure under some circumstances. 
Some 98% of the 300 respondents held doctoral degrees in psychology and the majority 
of them practiced in outpatient settings. Approximately 17% of the respondents indicated they 
had completed continuing education credits in the last two years, which incorporated content 
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related to the legal duties in dealing with high-risk clients. The vast majority of the sample 
indicated they were very up-to-date or somewhat up-to-date regarding their knowledge of 
Tarasoff-related duties, whereas only 10.5% of the sample indicated they had substantial 
uncertainty about their own understanding of the legal obligations. The results indicated that on 
average, 76.4% of respondents were incorrect in selecting the one statement that most accurately 
represented the duty to protect law in their respective state. In the Ohio and Michigan sample, the 
vast majority of respondents were aware they had a statutory duty, but only 29.5% of them knew 
the specific means of discharging the duty. Nearly half of the psychologists from the Ohio and 
Michigan sample were unaware that the statutory duty in their states could be discharged through 
means other than issuing a warning. Moreover, 87% of the psychologists from the New York 
sample and 37.2% of the psychologists from Texas incorrectly believed they were legally 
mandated to protect third-parties. Additionally, 22% of the psychologists from Texas and 53% of 
the psychologists from New York believed they had a specific duty to warn despite the fact that 
both states have no such statutory requirement. 
When asked under what circumstances they felt justified to warn the third-party, 41.5% 
of the respondents indicated they felt justified warning a potential victim when the likelihood of 
the client acting on the threat was low or in situations in which the therapist is unable to 
determine the specific likelihood of the individual acting on the threat. Pabian, et al. (2009) 
concluded these responses were inconsistent with the APA Ethics Code (2002) which requires 
client consent to release information absent a legal mandate. Moreover, the researchers found 
that the majority of the respondents failed to identify the various protective measures their 
particular state specifies relative to Tarasoff duties. For example, 52.1% of the Texas 
psychologists believed that they were authorized by statute to warn the potential victim, when, in 
35 
 
fact, the Texas statute has no such obligation. The researchers also considered the effect of 
mandated versus non-mandated continuing education hours in ethical and legal issues on the 
knowledge exhibited by respondents in the study. There were no significant accuracy differences 
between psychologists who saw more than five violent clients within the last two years and those 
who saw fewer. Thus, it appears that psychologists in this study are not only collectively 
misinformed about their respective state statute but also overestimated their confidence about 
their knowledge level. They also appear to be operating, likely unintentionally, outside the APA 
Ethics Code.  Furthermore, therapists’ experience with violent clients and continuing education 
appear unrelated to accuracy ratings. 
The Present Study 
 Based on the literature reviewed, and as noted in the Introduction, this project evaluated 
West Virginia mental health therapists’ knowledge of court cases related to duty to protect or 
warn third parties. 
There were five hypotheses for this project. I predicted that: 
 First, the overall knowledge therapists have regarding Tarasoff- related court 
cases will be low. 
  Second, there will be no differences observed between psychologists and 
counselors regarding their respective accuracy rates and knowledge of Tarasoff- 
related court cases. 
  Third, the overall accuracy rates for counselors and psychologists regarding their 
understanding of the original Tarasoff decision will be low and will have no 
significant differences between the disciplines.  
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 Fourth, there will be no relationship between accuracy ratings of the post 
Tarasoff- related court cases and continuing education experiences. 
  Finally, the accuracy ratings of psychologists and counselors on the post 
Tarasoff- related cases will not be related significantly to years of experience 
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  Chapter 3 
    Methods 
Participants 
The current research project was originally designed to survey psychologists, counselors 
and social workers in West Virginia on the issue of their knowledge of Tarasoff-related court 
cases. The survey instead focused on psychologists and counselors who were practicing in West 
Virginia because the email addresses of the social workers registered within the Board were not 
made available for this project. The developed survey was linked to a solicitation email sent to 
597 licensed psychologists, 115 supervised psychologists, and 403 licensed professional 
counselors. A total of 163 participants began the survey and a total of 115 completed the survey.   
Procedure 
  In order to assess participants’ level of awareness of Tarasoff-related court cases as well 
as the particulars of the original Tarasoff decisions, a survey was developed which included 
basic demographic information, including age range, gender, years in practice, highest degree 
achieved, discipline, current site of practice and licensure status.  One question dealt with 
whether or not their practice location was considered rural or urban. There were also questions 
regarding the participants’ experiences with Tarasoff-related activities including whether or not 
they themselves have either issued a Tarasoff warning or whether they have been consulted by 
anyone regarding a duty to warn issue. Additional questions were included to evaluate 
respondents’ experiences with warning intended victims including the relationship between the 
patient and the threatened third-party. Questions also were developed to measure the 
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participants’ exposure to ethics training and the extent to which it was specific to dealing with 
dangerous clients.    
Five clinical scenarios were developed and each was based on a particular Tarasoff-
related case. The first scenario was based roughly upon the particulars of Peck v. The Counseling 
Services of Addison County (1985) in which there was a threat to do serious damage to property. 
The second scenario was based roughly on cases like Boulanger v. Pol (1995) in which the 
pivotal issue was the fact that the victim had prior knowledge of the existing threat. Scenario 
three was based upon the case of Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals (1991) that 
involved an unknowing hospital employee in West Virginia who was exposed to human 
immunodeficiency virus following an altercation with a patient. The fourth case was based 
roughly upon the Ewing v. Goldstein (2004) case in which the threat was not delivered verbally 
to the therapist by a client but conveyed to the therapist by a concerned family member of the 
patient. The final scenario was based roughly upon the particulars of Garner v. Stone (1999) and 
involved the issuance of a warning to a third-party in a jurisdiction with only a statutory duty to 
protect and no statutory immunity for professionals. A copy of this survey has been placed in the 
Appendix section of this document. 
The process by which the court cases were selected was as follows. Tarasoff-related court 
cases were difficult to locate and retrieve. There was no clearinghouse for these cases and State 
Boards generally do not make applicable court cases within its jurisdiction available to members 
or researchers (Benjamin et al., 2009). Traditional search mechanisms were used including 
Nexus-Lexis and EBSCO. Arguably, the selection of court cases to be used as the basis for 
analysis in a survey was somewhat arbitrary. Despite this, the following variables were used in 
considering the cases to be selected for inclusion in the study. First, because the survey focused 
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on West Virginia mental health therapists, the selection of a case from West Virginia was both 
crucial and relevant. Second, consideration was given to court cases in which there was an 
expansion upon the original Tarasoff duties. Many times when courts render decisions either 
expanding or refining statutory duty or a common law duty, the decision often speaks to the 
question of when the duty was relevant. Generally, depending on the jurisdiction, Tarasoff-
related court cases which were dismissed through summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
did not necessarily provide any additional definitions as to the form of the current Tarasoff-
related duties within that jurisdiction. Those cases were generally dismissed due to insufficient 
cause of action, the lack of the definition of a special relationship, or the lack of duty to control 
the behavior of a client receiving outpatient services. Furthermore, these types of cases did not 
generally add additional risks to clinicians practicing within that jurisdiction. 
 Third, consideration was given to cases which were referenced in multiple publications 
or generated extensive commentary and analysis within the mental health literature. Some cases 
were the subject of multiple articles whereas others seemed to only receive cursory attention 
because they tended to not be expansive rulings or there was summary judgment for the 
defendant.  
Finally, consideration was given to court cases which generated subsequent legislative 
action and statutory changes, which was the case in the original Tarasoff decisions and more 
recently true for Morgan in the state of Ohio. This criterion was true for both the Peck v. The 
Counseling Services of Addison County (1985) case as well as the Ewing v. Goldstein (2004) 
case. Some states now extend Tarasoff duties to extensive property damage threats and some 
states give due consideration to communications which were relayed to therapists by means of 
family members. 
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In addition to these five scenarios, the survey also included seven true/false questions 
regarding the original Tarasoff decisions. These questions included items designed to assess 
participants’ knowledge of the scope and the ramifications of the original Tarasoff decisions. 
The draft of the survey was distributed to a small group of doctoral students in clinical 
psychology to solicit feedback about clarity and readability of the survey. Feedback from this 
group was gathered and slight modifications were made in the wording of one of the scenarios. 
The project was approved by Marshall University's Institutional Review Board. The 
informed consent form was situated as the first page of the survey. It outlined the scope of the 
project and highlighted the minimal risks to participants as well as the fact that the survey was 
confidential to the extent possible, including the lack of recording of IP addresses. 
Requests for contact information were sent to the West Virginia Board of Examiners in 
Counseling; the West Virginia Counselors Association; West Virginia Licensed Professional 
Counselors Association; the West Virginia Board of Social Work Examiners; and the West 
Virginia Board of Examiners of Psychologists.  Contact information was obtained for 
psychologists and counselors but the information for social workers was not made available for 
this project.  
The survey was uploaded to Survey Monkey. The survey was linked to a solicitation 
email and sent to 597 licensed psychologists, 115 supervised psychologists, and 403 licensed 
professional counselors.  Participants were encouraged to complete the survey and were advised 
that there was no penalty or negative consequence for exiting the survey at any point. A second 
solicitation email was sent approximately 15 days after the first solicitation.  
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       Chapter 4 
Results 
The survey invitation was sent by email to 403 licensed professional counselors, 597 
licensed psychologists, and 115 supervised psychologists. A total of 163 started the survey and 
115 individuals completed the survey for a completion rate of 70.5% and a response rate of 
14.6%. As indicated in Table 1, the largest percentage of respondents, 30.7%, was between the 
ages of 50 and 59, some 24.8 % of the sample was between the ages of 40 and 49, and 21.6% of 
the sample was between the ages of 30 and 39. 
Table 1  
  Age Range of Sample    
  Frequency Percent 
 20-29          9      5.9 
 30-39         33    21.6 
 40-49         38    24.8 
 50-59         47    30.7 
 60-69         19    12.4 
 70+          7      4.6 
 
 As indicated in Table 2, the largest group within the sample reported being in practice 
more than 16 years (45.8) and those practicing between 11 and 15 years were 20.3% of the total. 
Regarding the gender of the therapist, the sample was 68% female and 32% male. 
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Table 2 
Number of years in practice    
            Frequency     Percent 
 0-2 years     7            4.6 
 2-5 years    16           10.5 
 5-10 years    29             19 
 11-15 years    31           20.3 
 16+ years    70           45.8 
 
Individuals with a doctoral degree comprised 31.3% of the sample, while those with a 
master’s degree constituted 68.7% of the sample. Psychologists accounted for 64.1% (n=98) of 
the total sample completing the survey, and 35.9% (n= 55) reported having counseling degrees.     
Table 3 indicated that the current sites of practice for participants which revealed that 37.9% of 
respondents were in private practice, and 30.3% were employed at a community mental health 
center.  
 
Table 3 
Current Site of Practice  
           Frequency   Percent 
 Private practice        55      37.9 
 Hospital         26      17.9 
 Academic    15      10.3 
 Community Mental Health  44      30.3 
 School psychology    5               3.4         
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 The vast majority of the sample was comprised of independently licensed practitioners 
(79.0%) whereas 21% were yet to be independently licensed. Participant responses indicated that 
56.3% of respondents described their practice in an urban area, and 43.7% described their 
practice as being in a rural area. 
  Of those responding to the survey, 43.1 % (n=66) indicated that they have issued a duty 
to warn notice because of client threats, while 56.9% (n=87) reported that they had not. As 
shown in Table 4, the majority of the warnings were issued to intended victims and law 
enforcement.   
Table 4  
Percentages of Recipients of Warnings   
                                          Frequency   Percent 
 Police only                                    9     15.5 
 Intended victim only                       26     44.8 
 Police and intended victim           23              39.7  
 
Regarding the nature of the relationship between the client and the intended victim, most 
of the intended victims were non-family members whereas family members and spouses 
constituted an almost equal percentage of the total, as displayed in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
  Percentages of the Relationship between the Client and the Target of the Threat  
  
                                      Frequency Percent 
 Spouse          11     18.6 
 Partner           2      3.4 
 Family member        12     20.3 
 Coworker          7     11.9 
 Another provider         5      8.5 
 Other non-family member       22     37.3 
 
Regarding the respondents being consulted by a peer experiencing a duty to warn 
situation, 56.9% of the respondents indicated that they had been contacted and 43.1% indicated 
that they had not. 
Regarding training in the area of duty to warn, 77.1% (n=118) of the participants 
indicated that they had received training specific to the area of duty to protect, and 22.9% (n=35) 
indicated that they had not received such training. Of those who reported that they had received 
training, most reported that the training was part of their graduate training (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
 Percentage of Types of Training in Duty to Warn or Protect    
                                                                                                   Frequency      Percent 
 Included in an ethics class which was part of your graduate training      44               37.6 
 Included in training or in service on general, legal issues         54     46.2 
 Specific to the topic of a therapist's duty to warn or protect         19     16.2 
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The reported degree of familiarity with the original Tarasoff cases was summarized in 
Table 7 which revealed that the vast majority of the sample indicated that they were somewhat to 
quite familiar with the  cases. 
Table 7  
Degree of Familiarity with the Legal Decisions of the Cases Known as Tarasoff?  
  
                        Frequency    Percent 
 Not familiar at all      9           5.9 
 Not very familiar     10           6.6 
 Somewhat familiar         103          67.8 
 Quite familiar      30          19.7  
  
Results of Questions Related to the Original Tarasoff Decisions 
There were seven questions developed that dealt with assessing participants’ knowledge 
and understanding of the findings as well as the implications of the original Tarasoff decisions. 
The first question asked whether the court mandated that only intended victims need to be 
notified of threats directed at them. Of those responding, 56.6% of the total sample correctly 
identified this statement as false (see Table 8). 
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Table 8 
Responses to Questions regarding Original Tarasoff Decisions by Discipline 
Question #1: The court mandated that only intended victims be notified of threats directed at 
them. 
True  Psychologists  n=44, (30.3%) 
True  Counselors  n=19, (13.1%) 
False  Psychologists  n=50, (34.5%) 
False  Counselors  n=32, (22.1%) 
χ² (1) = 1.228, p = .268*   
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance,  p < .05. 
The second question asked whether the court in the original Tarasoff case mandated that 
only local law enforcement be notified of threats toward third-parties.  Nearly all of the 
participants, with the exception of five psychologists, responded correctly (see Table 9).   
 Table 9  
Responses to Questions regarding Original Tarasoff Decisions by Discipline 
Question #2: The court mandated that only the local police be notified of a threat directed at an 
individual. 
True  Psychologists  n=5, (3.4%) 
True  Counselors  n=0, (0%) 
False  Psychologists  n=90, (61.6%) 
False  Counselors  n=51, (34.9%) 
χ² (1) = 2.779, p = .095*         
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Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance,  p < .05. 
 The third question asked whether the original Tarasoff court stated that the duty to 
protect third-parties may be discharged by hospitalizing a threatening client. Only 15.8% of the 
sample correctly identified this as a component of the original Tarasoff decisions (see Table 10). 
Table 10 
 Responses to Questions regarding Original Tarasoff Decisions by Discipline 
Question #3: The court stated that the duty to protect third parties may be discharged by 
hospitalizing the client making the threat. 
True  Psychologists  n=15, (10.3%) 
True  Counselors  n=8, (5.5%) 
False  Psychologists  n=79, (54.5%) 
False  Counselors  n=43, (29.7%) 
χ² (1) = .002, p = .966* 
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance,  p < .05. 
 The next question asked whether the original Tarasoff decisions included that a therapist 
could discharge the duty to protect through verbally warning the intended victim. Approximately 
66% of the total sample incorrectly believed that the original Tarasoff decisions resulted in a 
mandated duty to warn (see Table 11). 
Table 11 
Responses to Questions regarding Original Tarasoff Decisions by Discipline 
Question #4: The court concluded that a therapist could discharge the duty to protect through 
the process of verbally warning the intended victim. 
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True  Psychologists  n=61, (42.4%) 
True  Counselors  n=34, (23.6%) 
False  Psychologists  n=33, (22.9%) 
False  Counselors  n=16, (11.1%) 
χ² (1) = .140, p = .708*  
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance,  p < .05. 
 Question five was based upon the perceived scope and power of court decisions from 
other jurisdictions. Specifically, the question asked if the original Tarasoff decisions mandated 
that therapists in all 50 states were required to warn and protect intended victims based upon 
verbal threats. Some 57.3% of the sample believed that the California court systems generated 
mandates for all 50 states regarding the issue of Tarasoff duties statement as false (see Table 12). 
 Table 12  
Responses to Questions regarding Original Tarasoff Decisions by Discipline 
Question #5: The decisions in the Tarasoff cases mandated that therapists in all 50 states are 
required to warn and protect intended victims based on clients’ verbal threats. 
True  Psychologists  n=51, (35.2%) 
True  Counselors  n=32, (22.1%) 
False  Psychologists  n=43, (29.7%) 
False  Counselors  n=19, (13.1%) 
χ² (1) = .974, p = .324*   
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance,  p < .05. 
Similarly, question six dealt with the scope and power of the judiciary to mandate 
changes in professional codes of ethics. Some 56.7% of the respondents incorrectly believed that 
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the Tarasoff court mandated that all mental health professional codes of ethics be amended to 
include mandatory notification of client threats directed toward third-parties. There was a 
significant difference between the responses of the two disciplines on this question in that 
psychologists were significantly more likely to answer this question correctly (see Table 13). 
Table 13 
 Responses to Questions regarding Original Tarasoff Decisions by Discipline 
Question #6: The court in the Tarasoff cases required that all mental health professional codes 
of ethics be amended to include mandatory notification of client threats directed at third parties. 
True  Psychologists  n=44, (30.8%) 
True  Counselors  n=37, (25.9%) 
False  Psychologists  n=49, (34.3%) 
False  Counselors  n=13, (9.1%) 
χ² (1) = 9.431, p = .002**  
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance,  p < .05. 
 
The final question in this series asked about the applicability of the original Tarasoff 
decisions to suicidal threats. Some 58.1% of the respondents correctly identified the fact that 
Tarasoff duties were not applicable in cases of suicidal threats (see Table 14). 
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Table 14  
Responses to Questions regarding Original Tarasoff Decisions by Discipline 
Question #7: The decisions in the Tarasoff cases are not applicable to suicidal threats. 
True  Psychologists  n=57, (39.9%) 
True  Counselors  n=26, (18.2%) 
False  Psychologists  n=36, (25.2%) 
False  Counselors  n=24, (16.8%) 
χ² (1) = 1.152, p = .283*   
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance,  p < .05 
 
Next, total accuracy scores were generated for the Tarasoff cases with one point given for 
each correct answer by the respondents so as to facilitate further analyses.  Individual scores 
were compiled into an accuracy score. Chi-square analyses were conducted comparing 
respondents’ total accuracy scores with several variables which were relevant to the research 
questions. The mean accuracy score for the participants on the original Tarasoff cases was 3.4 
out of a total of seven for a 49.5% accuracy rate. There was no significant relationship between 
participants’ total accuracy scores of the Tarasoff cases and their affiliated discipline, χ² (5, 
N=141) = 4.454, p = .486. Furthermore, there was no significant relationship between 
participants’ total accuracy scores of the Tarasoff cases and participants’ continuing education ,χ²  
(5, N=143) = 4.372, p = .497.Also, there was no significant relationship between participants’ 
total accuracy scores of the Tarasoff cases and participants’ number of years in practice, χ² (20, 
N=141) = 15.284, p = .760. There was no significant relationship between participants’ total 
accuracy scores of the Tarasoff cases and participants’ level of degree, χ² (5, N=139) = 4.948, p 
= .422  
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The Post Tarasoff -Related Court Cases Survey 
During this portion of the survey, participants were presented with scenarios based upon 
the particulars of five Tarasoff-related court cases. First, they were asked to evaluate each 
scenario and decide whether they felt they had a Tarasoff-related duty in this situation and 
second, what action they would take. Third, they were also asked to rate their degree of 
confidence about their personal decision on a four point Likert scale. They were also asked what 
they believed the court decided in this case and to rank their degree of confidence about their 
assessment of the court's actual decision.   
Scenario #1: Therapist Decision 
The first scenario involved the threat of potential lethal damage to property in which the 
court found there was a duty to warn and protect.  Of those responding, 62% of the total sample 
endorsed the alternative that best represented actions consistent with the actual court decisions.    
There was a statistically significant relationship between counselors and psychologists. 
Counselors were more likely to endorse the correct (see Table 15).    
Scenario #1: Therapist Ratings of Court Decisions 
Approximately 62.5% of the total sample endorsed the alternative that best represented 
the actual court decision which was that there was a duty to warn in cases of potential risk to life.   
There was no significant relationship between psychologists and counselors on accuracy ratings 
regarding decisions by the court (see Table 15). 
Table 15 
Accuracy and Confidence Ratings for Post-Tarasoff Court Case Scenarios  
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Scenario #1. Issue: Threats to Property 
 
Scenario #1 Therapist Clinical Decision 
    % Correct      Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  56.5% (n=48)**        2.98*    
 Counselors   73.9% (n=34)**                                       3.00* 
  χ² (1, N=131) = 3.878, p = .049              t (128) = -.19, p =.85  
 
Scenario #1 Therapist Court Choice 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  57.6% (n=49)*    2.47* 
 Counselors   71.7% (n=33)*    2.72* 
  χ² (1, N=131) = 2.532, p = .112  t (129) = -1.56, p =.12 
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance   p < .05 
 
Scenario #2: Therapist Decision 
The next Tarasoff-related court case involved a scenario in which the victim was already 
aware of a threat which had been verbalized in the past, in which case there was generally no 
duty to warn. Approximately 60.6% of the total number of respondents endorsed the alternative 
that best represented actions consistent with the actual decisions of the court.  There was not a 
significant difference between the professions on the issue of the degree of confidence (see Table 
16).    
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Scenario #2:  Therapist Ratings of Court Decisions 
 Some 66.7% of the psychologists (n=56), and 47.7% of the counselors (n=21), endorsed 
the alternative that best represented actions consistent with the actual decisions of the court.    
There was a significant difference between psychologists and counselors in terms of accuracy. 
Psychologists were more likely to endorse the correct answer in this scenario (see Table 16). 
 
 
  Table 16 
Accuracy and Confidence Ratings for Post-Tarasoff Court Case Scenarios  
Scenario #2. Issue: Threats are Known to Victim 
 
Scenario #2 Therapist Clinical Decision 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  63.9% (n=53)      3.04 
 Counselors   54.5% (n=24)       3.05 
  χ² (1, N=127) = 1.044, p = .307*  t (125) = -.07, p =.95*       
 
Scenario #2 Therapist Court Choice 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  66.7% (n=56)      2.62 
 Counselors   47.7% (n=21)      2.73 
  χ² (1, N=128) = 4.321, p = .038**  t (126) = -.73, p =.47* 
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance   p < .05. 
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Scenario #3: Therapist Decision 
The next Tarasoff-related scenario was based upon Johnson v. West Virginia University 
Hospitals (1991) in which a hospital employee was intentionally bitten by a combative patient 
who was infected with human immunodeficiency virus. The hospital was held liable for damages 
for failure to warn. Approximately 11% of the total sample endorsed the alternative that best 
represented the actual court decisions. Only 8.4% of the psychologists (n=7), and 15.9% (n=7) of 
the counselors endorsed the alternative that best represented actions consistent with the actual 
decision of the court.  Over 65% of the total respondents did not feel there was a duty to warn or 
protect in this situation because of the presence of universal precautions in medical facilities (see 
Table 17). 
Scenario #3: Therapist Ratings of Court Decisions 
Approximately 15.2% of the total sample endorsed the actual court decisions. Some 
13.6% of the psychologists (n=11), and 18.2% (n=8) of the counselors, endorsed the alternative 
that best represented the decisions of the court. There was no significant relationship between the 
disciplines on accuracy regarding decisions by the court (see Table 17). 
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Table 17 
Accuracy and Confidence Ratings for Post-Tarasoff  Court Case Scenarios  
Scenario #3. Issue: Exposure to Communicable Diseases 
 
Scenario #3 Therapist Clinical Decision 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  8.4% (n=7)      2.78 
 Counselors   15.9% (n=7)      2.95 
  χ² (1, N=127) = 1.638, p = .201*  A:t (125) = -1.04, p =.30* 
 
Scenario #3 Therapist Court Choices 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  13.6% (n=11)      2.54 
 Counselors   18.2% (n=8)      2.73 
  χ² (1, N=125) = .468, p = .494*  C:t (124) = -1.13, p =.26*           
Note.  * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance   p < .05. 
 
Scenario #4: Therapist Decision 
The next Tarasoff-related scenario was based upon the Ewing v. Goldstein, (2004) case in 
which the information about the threat to a third-party did not come from the client but was 
conveyed to the therapist by the client’s family. The court held that such communication is the 
equivalent of patient communication. Some 27.6% of the total sample endorsed the alternative 
that best represented the actual court decisions. Only 24.1% of the psychologists (n=20), and 
34.1% of the counselors (n=15) endorsed the alternative that best represented actions consistent 
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with the actual decisions of the court. Nearly 30% of the sample indicated that they did not feel 
that there was a duty to warn or protect the intended victim in this case because the information 
did not come from the patient personally. Nearly 34% of the total respondents indicated that they 
did have a duty to warn or protect the intended victim but that the notification should have gone 
to the hospital staff. Finally, another 8.7% of the total respondents indicated that they did not 
have a duty to warn or protect because the patient was not presently under their care (see Table 
18). 
Scenario #4: Therapist Ratings of Court Decisions 
Some 31.7% of the total sample endorsed the actual court decisions. With respect to how 
they evaluated the court’s decisions, 24.4% of the psychologists (n=20), and 45.5% of counselors 
(n=20) endorsed the alternative that best represented the decisions of the court. There was a 
statistically significant difference revealing that psychologists on this particular scenario were 
more likely to endorse the incorrect answer (see Table 18). 
 
Table 18 
Accuracy and Confidence Ratings for Post-Tarasoff  Court Case Scenarios  
Scenario #4. Threat Communicated by Third Party 
 
Scenario #4 Therapist Clinical Decision 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  24.1% (n=20)      2.73 
 Counselors   34.1% (n=15)      2.77 
  χ² (1, N=127) = 1.439, p = .230*  t (124) = -1.13, p =.26*   
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Scenario #4 Therapist Court Choice 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  24.4% (n=20)      2.49 
 Counselors   45.5% (n=20)      2.66 
  χ² (1, N=126) = 5.864, p = .015**  t (125) = -1.05, p =.29 *  
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance   p < .05. 
Scenario #5: Therapist Decision 
The next Tarasoff-related scenario was based upon the Garner v. Stone (1999) case. In 
this case, the scenario involved an independent psychological evaluation being conducted with 
an employee of a local utility company following a safety violation at work. The scenario clearly 
indicated that both the patient and the therapist resided in a state in which the state statute had 
only a duty to protect third-parties and provided no immunity for therapists who disclosed 
information to meet a duty to protect.  During the evaluation, the patient became angry when 
discussing his supervisor and threatened to blow up the plant if he were terminated as a result of 
the evaluation. The therapist gave notice of the threat to the supervisory staff and the client was 
eventually terminated by the company. 
  A total of 56.9% of the sample endorsed the alternative that best represented the actual 
behavior of the therapist in the case. Approximately 53.1% of the psychologists (n= 43), and 
64.3% of the counselors (n= 27) endorsed the alternative that best represented actions consistent 
with components of the actual decisions of the court (see Table 19).  
Scenario #5: Therapist Ratings of Court Decisions 
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Some 8% of the total respondents endorsed the actual court decisions. With respect to 
how they judged the court’s decisions, 11.0% of the psychologists (n=9), and 2.4% of counselors 
(n=1) endorsed the alternative that best represented the decisions of the court (see Table 19). 
   
Table 19 
Accuracy and Confidence Ratings for Post-Tarasoff  Court Case Scenarios  
Scenario #5. Independent Evaluation and Lack of Statutory Immunity 
 
Scenario #5 Therapist Clinical Decision 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  53.1% (n=43)      2.82 
 Counselors   64.3% (n=27)      2.85 
  χ² (1, N=123) = 1.415, p = .234*  t (121) = -.24, p = .81* 
 
 
 
 
Scenario #5 Therapist Court Choice 
    % Correct   Degree of Confidence 
 Psychologists  11.0% (n=9)      2.36 
 Counselors   2.4% (n=1)      2.56 
  χ² (1, N=124) = 2.767, p = .096*  t (120) = -1.19, p =.24* 
Note. * indicates no significance and ** indicates significance   p < .05. 
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Decision Accuracy Scores for Post-Tarasoff -Related Court Cases 
In order to better quantify the collective performances of the respondents and to facilitate 
further statistical analyses, a total decision accuracy score was generated from answers to the 
post-Tarasoff-related Court Cases Survey. These scores were then used for comparison and 
hypotheses testing with participant demographics, participant experiences with Tarasoff-related 
cases, and their continuing education activities. 
 The overall knowledge of Tarasoff-related court cases as measured by the responses of 
participants to the scenarios indicated an overall accuracy rating of approximately 44%.  There 
were no significant differences between psychologists and counselors on the overall accuracy 
scores, t (120) = -1.820, p = .071, but a significant difference was observed between doctoral 
level and masters level professionals in that the masters level professionals were more accurate. 
Furthermore, a post hoc analysis using univariate analysis of the variance, showed an interaction 
between highest degree and discipline, F (1, 116) = 4.980, p = .028, indicating that counselors 
and those with masters degrees were more accurate, F (1, 116) = 5.162, p = .025. 
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     Chapter 5 
Discussion 
Nearly 43% of the sample in the present study reported that they have issued a warning 
notice because of client threats, which underscores the importance of duty-to-warn issues. Nearly 
57% reported that they had not. Similarly, half of the sample in the Binder & McNiel (1996) 
study had experience with issuance of warnings. Wise (1978) reported that 49.7% of the sample 
had issued a warning the year prior to the Tarasoff decisions and 37% of the sample indicated 
that they had issued warnings post Tarasoff. In the present study, of those who indicated they had 
issued such a warning, nearly 45 % indicated that they had notified only the intended victim, 
while nearly 40% responded that they had notified both the intended victim and police. Another 
15% of respondents indicated that they had only notified the police. In contrast, 31.3% of the 
respondents who had issued warnings in the Wise (1978) study indicated that they had notified a 
family member of the victim, while only 16% notified the victim. In the current study, almost 
60% of the respondents indicated that they had been contacted for peer consultation in a potential 
Tarasoff-related situation, while nearly 40% indicated that they had never been contacted for 
consultation. 
In sum, the sample in this study had a comparable amount of experience with Tarasoff- 
related situations as previous studies mentioned above. Over half of the respondents in this study 
indicated that they had been consulted by a peer for consultation in a Tarasoff-related situation. 
The continuing education experiences of this sample were extensive, indicating that they should 
have been a well-informed group of participants. In contrast, the accuracy ratings from questions 
related to the original Tarasoff decisions as well as the post-Tarasoff-related court cases were 
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relatively low. By contrast, participants’ confidence ratings were relatively high regarding their 
decision-making and knowledge of Tarasoff-related cases. Thus, over half the sample in this 
study could be described as having dealt with a Tarasoff-related case, and were under informed 
and overconfident about their understanding and knowledge of the outcomes of various Tarasoff-
related cases. 
Overall, the knowledge participants demonstrated on this survey regarding the original 
Tarasoff decisions was quite low despite the fact that nearly 90% of the sample reported that they 
were somewhat or quite familiar with the cases known as Tarasoff. The vast majority, over 80%, 
of the sample indicated they were very up-to-date or somewhat up-to-date regarding their 
knowledge of Tarasoff-related duties, whereas only 10% of the sample indicated they had 
substantial uncertainty about their own understanding of the legal obligations. While the 
overwhelming majority correctly stated that the Tarasoff duties were not applicable to suicidal 
threats, only 16% of the sample knew that a therapist could discharge the Tarasoff duties by 
hospitalizing a dangerous patient. This particular question represented the essence of the original 
Tarasoff duties. Furthermore, 66% of the participants in this survey incorrectly believed that 
therapists could discharge the duty to protect third-parties by verbally warning the intended 
victim. 
 Equally revealing were the findings regarding the scope and power of the judiciary 
related to issuances of mandates of the Tarasoff duties. Approximately 60% of the respondents in 
the survey erroneously believed that court systems from other jurisdictions can promulgate 
rulings directly applicable to other states and jurisdictions. Similarly, nearly 60% of respondents 
in the survey also erroneously believed that the scope and power of the judiciary included 
mandating changes in professional codes of ethics. The participants exhibited profound levels of 
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misunderstanding of the case law and they also erroneously attributed tremendous authority to 
the judiciary to mandate changes in other jurisdictions and to compel changes in ethics codes. If 
those were in fact true, then participant accuracy scores for court decisions from other 
jurisdictions should have been higher. Furthermore, the reported level of familiarity with these 
cases was clearly overstated. The combination of overconfidence and lack of understanding 
observed here may explain why the Tarasoff duties are often oversimplified and mistakenly 
reduced to a duty to warn. Slightly less than 10% of the total respondents endorsed the decision 
by the court that the therapist was held liable for breaching confidentiality because of the nature 
of the state statute. If this apparent disregard for statutory immunity were actually part of the 
manner in which a therapist was to proceed with breaching confidentiality, that therapist could 
have liability exposure in the event that the client could prove damages resulted from the 
warning.   
Overall, the knowledge and understanding demonstrated by therapists regarding post-
Tarasoff-related court cases was low in most instances as evidenced by the accuracy scores. In 
contrast, participants’ confidence levels range was 2.75-3.04 out of a possible score of four. 
Furthermore, therapists in this survey overall did not generally anticipate court decisions 
accurately. Their accuracy scores for cases involving threats to property and scenarios in which 
the victim was aware of the threat were more accurate than responses to situations involving 
communicable diseases and threats conveyed by concerned family members. Taken together 
with the accuracy results from the original Tarasoff cases, the overall knowledge and 
understanding of the Tarasoff duties remain problematic for therapists. Their relatively high 
confidence ratings of their perceived knowledge were in contrast to the relatively low accuracy 
scores. Furthermore, the lack of regard for immunity, as in the fifth scenario, and the 
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overreliance on hospital policy, as in the third scenario, are potential negligence risks for 
therapists. The latter case represented an area of Tarasoff-related expansion and potential risks 
for therapists in West Virginia particularly as the hospital case was based on a court case 
adjudicated in West Virginia. Finally, as hypothesized, total accuracy scores for respondents on 
the Tarasoff-related court cases were essentially unrelated to discipline, licensure status, years of 
experience, and continuing education training. 
The results from this study indicated that, across all demographic variables, the overall 
accuracy scores for both counselors and psychologists were low. However, there were findings 
within these data that warranted exploration. Although overall accuracy scores were low for 
psychologists and counselors, post hoc analyses revealed some noteworthy results. First, those 
with less experience tended to be slightly more accurate than their more experienced peers and 
counselors were slightly more accurate than psychologists on accuracy ratings of court cases. 
These post hoc analyses must be viewed cautiously as overall participant accuracy scores were 
low across all categories including discipline, years in practice and continuing education 
experiences. 
  Research has revealed conflicting results regarding novice therapists compared with 
experienced ones. Some research has found differences between novice and experienced 
therapists on some outcome measurements including treatment planning and case 
conceptualization analyses (Boisvert and Faust, 2006; Martin, Slemon, Hiebert, Hallberg, & 
Cummings, 1989; Mayfield, Kardash, & Kivlighan, 1999). For example, O’Byrne & Goodyear 
(1992), in their research comparing the assessment strategies of novice and experienced 
therapists, found that novice therapists tended to focus more on the crisis-related aspects of the 
client’s situation than their more experienced counterparts. Therefore, it is possible that in 
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scenarios involving potential homicidal threats, therapists with less experience focused more on 
the legal and ethical risks associated with the situation than a focus on underlying, thematic 
issues. Furthermore, experienced therapists have learning histories in which they successfully 
intervened with clients uttering various types of threatening behaviors upon which they rarely 
act. Experienced therapists may spend more time contextualizing the threatening behaviors and 
generating interventions than simply focusing on whether or not a Tarasoff duty exists. This is 
not to imply that experienced therapists are somehow indifferent to duties to third-parties. It is 
merely suggested that experienced therapists focus on different aspects of client behaviors than 
do novice therapists which could account for any subtle difference noted between the two 
groups. Also, experienced therapists may have slightly higher thresholds for what constitutes a 
duty to a third-party because of their varied experiences with threatening clients. 
Another possible explanation for the findings in this study regarding experience and 
accuracy scores was that the less- experienced participants were more likely to have had more 
recent exposure to didactics in the area of ethics. Therefore, their accuracy scores may be slightly 
impacted by the recency of relevant training experiences. 
Another potential reason for this slight but significant difference observed on the issue of 
experience and accuracy may reside in the characteristics of the sample itself. In particular, over 
half of the respondents were between the ages of 40 and 60. Some of those individuals would 
have been in training prior to, or just after, the original Tarasoff decisions were handed down in 
1974 and 1976. More importantly, the clinical instructors and supervisors of this group would 
have likely had values representing an ethical and legal body of knowledge more reflective of a 
pre-Tarasoff professional environment. As previously mentioned, before the original Tarasoff 
decisions were issued, it was not unusual for practitioners to warn or protect third-parties for 
65 
 
purely ethical reasons absent a legal mandate (Wise, 1978). Also, the first Tarasoff ruling 
primarily articulated the duty to warn. Much of the consternation following Tarasoff was based 
on the arduous acceptance of a mandated duty to warn. Therefore, those professionals, who 
trained most of the therapists in the sample in this study, would likely have held the views that 
prevailed just after Tarasoff, which were generally negative. Many viewed the duty to warn as 
intrusive with regard to the judgment of therapists and generally detrimental to the 
psychotherapeutic relationship (Stone, 1976). Also, many of the teaching professionals would 
have had little to no formal ethics training with regard to the duty to third-parties given that their 
own training predated the decisions and the mandated continuing education in ethics. Now 
required in many states for licensure renewal, those requirements had yet to be instituted 
(Neimeyer, Taylor & Wear, 2011).  
The issue regarding the slight though significant differences between the professions is 
more difficult to explain. Part of the explanation may be related to supervision. Borders & Usher 
(1992) found that the majority of the counselors in their sample worked in settings other than 
private practice. Therefore, it is likely that the counselors in this particular study are situated in 
large organizations which typically have policies and procedures governing risk management 
which would likely sensitize professionals to the issues related to duties to third-parties.  
Secondly, counselors in these types of organizations are more likely to have access to 
multidisciplinary opinions. Borders & Usher (1992) found that most of the counselors in their 
study were, in fact, supervised by non-counseling professionals including psychologists, 
psychiatrists, social workers and administrators. It is, therefore, plausible that on average, 
counselors may have a more diverse exposure to different clinical opinions, including those 
involving duties to third-parties. Exposure to these divergent clinical opinions may contribute to 
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improved judgment and accuracy in Tarasoff-related scenarios.  Also, there could be differences 
in undergraduate and graduate curricula that may account for the differences noted in this study 
between counselors and psychologists.    
   Research has  shown (Felthous, & Kachigian, 2001; Fulero,1988; Givelber et al.,1984; 
Herbert, 2002; Herbert & Young, 2002; Pabian et al., 2009) that therapists tend to construe the 
Tarasoff duties as  primarily issuing warnings to others rather than a duty to exercise due care to 
protect the third-party. This presupposition is likely to be observed across all levels of experience 
in part due to the reasons discussed above. Even internet search mechanisms like Psych INFO 
used the “duty to warn” phrase as the appropriate search term when seeking data on 
psychotherapists’ responsibility with respect to dangerous clients (Pabian et al., 2009).  Thus, the 
duty to warn concept, which was part of the first Tarasoff decision and subsequently vacated by 
the second Tarasoff decision, has become the stereotypical descriptor for this particular set of 
duties. This is likely still the case among all mental health professionals and is likely to bias their 
analysis of their options in Tarasoff-related scenarios. That bias was likely a factor in the 
responses of the sample in this study. The gravity of this bias is addressed below. 
Implications of the Research 
The significance of understanding post-Tarasoff-related court decisions and their 
subsequent impact upon risk management for therapists is the essence of the current project. 
Following the initial Tarasoff decisions, both state legislatures and courts systems in other 
jurisdictions utilized the Tarasoff principles to address duties to third-parties within their local 
jurisdictions. Tarasoff shaped both subsequent judicial decisions as well as the statutory 
language used in relevant state codes.  Practicing clinicians need to be aware of subsequent 
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Tarasoff-related court cases in order to adequately manage risk (Glancy & Chaimowitz, 2005). 
The essence of managing the risks of potential Tarasoff-related duties in one jurisdiction 
includes recognizing the potential areas of expansion within their own jurisdiction, based upon 
the expansion of Tarasoff duties that have occurred in other jurisdictions. These expansions are 
part of the history of the Tarasoff-related cases. Therefore, when therapists are confronted with 
threatening clients, it is essential that those therapists have a working knowledge of their 
respective codes of ethics, their local state’s statute regarding unauthorized disclosure, and an 
awareness of court cases that may have articulated expansions of Tarasoff-related duties, 
particularly those that have not been addressed sufficiently within a particular therapists 
jurisdiction - either statutorily or through case law. The relevance of post-Tarasoff-related court 
cases for individual therapists reside in essentially two clinical areas; the point at which a 
Tarasoff-related duty is triggered and the circumstances under which the application of the 
Tarasoff principle is relevant. 
There are essentially three sources of data regarding the analysis of any Tarasoff-related 
clinical scenario. The first source of these data is the relevant professional ethics code. In 
general, the ethics code for both psychologists and counselors are essentially permissive of 
disclosures that are consistent with legal mandates or conform to statutory language (American 
Counseling Association, 2005; American Psychological Association, 2002). Because there is not 
a national standard for issues related to duties to third-parties, the respective ethics codes offer 
little guidance on how to manage a Tarasoff-related scenario except to encourage therapists to 
comply with the law.  
The second source of data regarding the management of Tarasoff-related duties is the 
relevant state statute. Participants in this study were asked to apply their knowledge of state 
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statutes to their case analyses. In the case of West Virginia, the statute is brief and somewhat 
vague.  It only speaks to allowing unauthorized disclosure in order “to protect from substantial 
and imminent threat to self or others” but is silent with respect to what actions are considered 
appropriate in order to properly exercise the discretion to protect others from harm (W. Va. Code 
§27-3-1). Furthermore, the relevant West Virginia state statute makes no reference to the 
issuance of a warning and there is no mention of immunity from civil prosecution for disclosures 
or any other protective measure. Essentially, it states that unauthorized disclosure may occur in 
an attempt to offer protection. Also, the West Virginia state statute tends to conflate homicidal 
and suicidal threats in the language of the statute. 
The third source of information for therapists who are confronted with a potential 
Tarasoff-related duty is the progeny of Tarasoff-related court cases. To be certain, cases that 
have been litigated within the jurisdiction in which the therapist practices would likely have the 
most relevance in the decision-making process, as those cases would have likely clarified the 
duties either by expanding it or defining a new threshold for triggering the duties. Also, they 
would be case law for subsequent litigation.  Arguably, given the manner in which the Tarasoff 
principles have been applied nationwide, court cases from other jurisdictions may have potential 
relevance for therapists who deal with threatening clients, as they approach final disposition for a 
particular client and attempt to manage their own exposure to risk and liability. Monahan (1993) 
argues that documentation of the plans contemplated can minimize liability in the event of 
alleged malpractice. Based on the findings of this project, it is recommended that contemplation 
of the relevant court cases should be part of those analyses in a manner advocated by others 
including Hansen & Goldberg (1999). 
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The results of the present study indicated that the West Virginia psychologists and 
counselors responding to this survey exhibited an overall lack of knowledge of the original 
Tarasoff decisions and displayed difficulty with their ability to accurately anticipate the 
outcomes of post-Tarasoff-related court decisions. Furthermore, there was also a significant 
misunderstanding of the manner in which court decisions from one jurisdiction became relevant 
in other jurisdictions. Also, the respondents in the survey seemed to lack an understanding of the 
interactions among specific court cases in one jurisdiction and the implications of those decisions 
for applicable codes of ethics. Therefore, therapists may be inadequately prepared to apply 
ethical standards and legal principles derived from court cases to their own clinical reasoning 
process during the management of a particular Tarasoff-related scenario. These errors could 
seriously impact their exposure to liability for negligence either for improper disclosures or 
failure to apply Tarasoff- related protective measures.  
Furthermore, it is likely, although not tested directly in this study, there may have been a 
lack of understanding of the relevant West Virginia state statutes regarding exceptions to patient-
therapist confidentiality, which may have impacted some responses to the survey. Most 
respondents in this study apparently believe that the duties to third-parties in all states are based 
on fiat from California courts and not necessarily based on a state statute. One could infer that 
their knowledge of the statute was limited as well.  Further, the language of the applicable, and 
discretionary, state statute in West Virginia (W. Va. Code §27-3-1) is grossly different from the 
language of affirmative duties promulgated by the Tarasoff court. Finally, the participants in the 
survey, overall, rated their levels of confidence regarding their awareness and judgment of these 
cases relatively high. The implications of these general findings will be considered in context of 
risk management. 
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Given the overall low accuracy scores of the participants in the survey and their relatively 
high levels of confidence regarding their knowledge and judgment of these cases, therapists with 
that particular constellation of attributes, are at risk of misapplying the Tarasoff principles. For 
example, the West Virginia state statute regarding exceptions to authorize disclosures has no 
explicit immunity language within that statute. Furthermore, there is no language specific to a 
duty to warn. The statutory language approximates a position that disclosures may be made in 
order to protect. There is neither specificity about the conditions under which such a trigger 
should occur, nor is their specificity about steps therapists may or should take that would be 
consistent with providing some form of protection. 
If therapists maintain that the essence of the Tarasoff duties is a duty to warn and other 
courts can mandate compliance, they may be too eager to issue a warning that may, in fact, be 
insufficient to reach a legal threshold of protection implied in the state code. Conversely, they 
may not contemplate a duty when other variables such as institutional policies, like universal 
precautions, become paramount. For example, participants in this particular study did not 
accurately anticipate the liability extended to the defendants in one documented West Virginia 
case in which Tarasoff principles were applied to an HIV exposure context. In Johnson v. West 
Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. (1991) the case had elements of both duties to warn and to 
protect in its analysis. Now it is case law in West Virginia and carries the power of judicial 
precedence.  Furthermore, if there is not clarity about the point at which a Tarasoff duty becomes 
relevant, therapists could erroneously over-predict the threat of violence in the context of high 
levels of misplaced confidence and low levels of actual legal knowledge. By contrast, therapists 
did not perceive the relevance of a Tarasoff-related duty and therefore not apply it in their case 
analysis. This reasoning may have been the rationale for the responses to that scenario in this 
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study in which the majority of participants did not recognize a duty because of universal 
precautions. This could result in unnecessary interventions, problematic warnings and potential 
liability risks clearly unseen by the majority of this sample.  
A second related risk for therapists in West Virginia is that they may issue a warning to a 
third-party in good faith and may, in fact, be unjustifiably breaching confidentiality. This type of 
exposure could happen in the event that the threat was determined to not be substantial or 
imminent, or if the court were to decide that a warning was insufficient to meet the letter or 
intent of the law around the protection language of the statute.  Therefore, part of the therapists’ 
liability could be an ethical and legal issue related to an unwarranted violation of confidentiality 
as was decided in Garner v. Stone (1999) and in Hopewell v. Adebimpe (1981). In the latter 
instance, a psychiatrist was found guilty of breaching confidentiality because he did not 
adequately assess the likelihood of a patient acting upon threatened violence before notifying the 
patient's supervisor of the threat.     
Furthermore, unwarranted warnings could also create interpersonal and, therefore, 
emotional difficulties for the client. There have been several cases involving Tarasoff-related 
duties and the issue of privilege including Vivano v. Moan (1994), in which Tarasoff-related 
warnings were issued and therapists were subsequently compelled to testify against their own 
client regarding the essence of the threatening behavior (Goldstein, & Calderone, 1992; Herbert, 
2004). Similarly, in U.S. v. Auster (2008), the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that 
the issuance of a Tarasoff warning, with patient’s prior knowledge that such a warning would be 
issued following a threat, placed the communication of the threat outside the privilege and 
therefore makes that fact admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the patient.  
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This dynamic has been referred to as the “criminalization of Tarasoff” by some commentators 
(Weiner, 2003; Weinstock et al., 2006). 
  The lack of knowledge of court cases and the confusion about the nature of the Tarasoff 
duties have other risks which require discussion. Therapists who lack understanding of the legal 
context of their clinical decisions also may inadvertently be operating outside their respective 
professional codes of ethics when failing to properly apply Tarasoff principles or failing to 
maintain competence about legal and ethical matters (Pabian et al., 2009). For example, the APA 
Ethics Code Section 2.03, on competence, states “Psychologists undertake ongoing efforts to 
develop and maintain their competence” (p.5). The issue of competence can become relevant in 
the event of alleged malpractice based upon negligence. Negligence is based, in part, upon a 
professional causing damage by deviating from recognized standards of care. Therapists who 
lack sufficient knowledge of relevant case law and statutory boundaries may also deviate from 
both the legal standards and, therefore, the ethical standards when engaging in unauthorized 
disclosures of confidential information. For example, the APA Ethics Code Section 4.05b (2002) 
states that “Psychologists disclose confidential information without the consent of the individual 
only as mandated by law or where permitted by law for a valid purpose….” (p.8). When legal 
compliance is imprecise, ethical violations may be applicable. It must be assumed that both legal 
and ethical risks would be greater for therapists with significant knowledge gaps in the areas of 
legal and ethical dynamics, as was seen in the sample in this study. 
Another risk for therapists lacking sufficient knowledge of court cases and the original 
Tarasoff-related duties is in the area of informed consent. As Pabian, et al., (2009) observed, it is 
difficult for therapists operating with a significant knowledge gap of legal and ethical issues to 
provide informed consent to their clients. Traditionally, informed consent includes, in part, 
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articulating the nature of the limits of confidentiality within the therapeutic relationship (Fisher 
& Oransky, 2008). Just as therapists need to know the point at which a Tarasoff duty is legally 
triggered by a particular clinical presentation, likewise they need to understand both the statutory 
limitations and the relevant case law in order to derive a legitimate informed consent process. 
Statutory changes typically lag behind judicial decisions. If the informed consent documents are 
based upon erroneous information regarding the scope of confidentiality, therapists could have 
liability exposure for failing to provide substantial informed consent. This particular issue has 
significant implications for therapists that have a high level of unwarranted confidence and a 
commensurate lack of understanding about their legal and ethical knowledge of duties to third-
parties. 
 Therapists who practice in jurisdictions in which Tarasoff duties have been expanded 
beyond their original statutory descriptors would be advised to consider inclusion of those 
extensions within their informed consent process. For example, therapists who practice in 
Vermont would be advised to consider including, in their informed consent process, possible 
duties to third-parties when serious threats to property are made by clients. Therapists who 
practice in other jurisdictions would be advised to be aware that potentially lethal property 
damage has been litigated in Vermont and should be a consideration in their reasoning regarding 
Tarasoff-related cases involving, for example, threats of arson. Likewise, therapists who live 
outside of California should be aware that the issue of threats of violence reported by family 
members have been construed by the courts as being the equivalent of patient communication 
and, therefore, may trigger a Tarasoff-related duty. Therapists in West Virginia should not 
necessarily consider this type of information the equivalent of receiving a threat from a patient 
directly. It is an important variable which should be considered when articulating a plan of action 
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with a patient who may be at risk of acting upon a threat of violence that has been uttered to 
someone other than the therapist.  
A few of the studies, conducted just after the original Tarasoff decisions were handed 
down, found that many therapists were uncomfortable about explicitly articulating the possibility 
of mandatory disclosures to third-parties, fearing that such acknowledgment would either 
damage the therapeutic relationship or cause the client to withdraw from therapy (Givelber et al., 
1984; Stone, 1976; Wise,1978). A therapist who intentionally withholds information from 
clients, and maintains that such behaviors are somehow in the client's best interest is potentially 
violating a principal of the ethics code (Fisher, 2008). Specifically, without full disclosure of the 
nature and scope of the conditions under which unauthorized disclosures can be made, therapists 
are undermining their professional conduct and possibly attenuating the ethical underpinning of 
fidelity and justice. 
Finally, it is advised that therapists generate a set of clinical alternatives based upon 
relevant state statutes and applicable case law to help manage the risks involved in treating the 
next potentially homicidal client. This preparation would also include the clinician's best 
approximation of the understanding of the scope of the Tarasoff duties as well as the point in the 
clinical evaluation at which the Tarasoff duties may be triggered. Even in situations in which the 
clinician feels that a strict duty to warn is clinically indicated and is legally and ethically sound, 
the prudent therapist must have an action plan beyond the actual execution of a Tarasoff-related 
duty to warn. That therapist still has a dangerous client to treat. 
   Approximately 40% of the sample in this study indicated that they had professional 
experiences in dealing with Tarasoff-related duties. Another 57% of the respondents indicated 
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that they had been contacted for peer consultation in a potential Tarasoff-related situation, while 
40% indicated that they had never been contacted for consultation. The levels of misplaced 
confidence about knowledge of Tarasoff-related duties and the commensurate low accuracy 
scores on post-Tarasoff-related court cases demonstrated by participants in the study highlighted 
the potential risks related to seeking and providing case consultation in Tarasoff-related 
situations. Just as the substantial lack of knowledge and understanding of the Tarasoff duties 
impacts a clinician's ability to shape appropriate informed consent, so these deficits affect the 
validity of consultations sought and provided. Low levels of understanding of Tarasoff-related 
duties and high levels of misplaced confidence can have their most harmful impact in the area of 
informed consent.  
Consultations are generally sought and provided in good faith. However, considering the 
data from this study, it is probable that there are instances in which individuals seeking 
consultations are likely receiving varying degrees of inaccurate and potentially misleading 
information from a professional with a high degree of misplaced confidence about duties to 
third-parties.  Furthermore, considering that there is a widely-held misconception that the 
Tarasoff duties are essentially distilled to a duty to warn, it is quite feasible that this 
misperception is fortified and promulgated through repetition of the phrase during individual 
case consultations. It is conceivable that the individuals seeking consultation may be as equally 
informed, or equally misinformed, as the person providing the consultation. Another issue, 
related to the provision of consultation, is how professionals are identified as a potential, credible 
resource within a given specialty area of psychotherapy. It is likely that these types of resources 
are identified either by years of experience or by reputation within the professional community. 
Given the results of this particular study and the low level of accuracy Tarasoff-related cases, 
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clinicians would be advised to be extraordinarily judicious regarding the selection of potential 
sources for consultation. 
  Clearly, the significant knowledge gaps in Tarasoff-related cases may actually be traced 
back to the type of supervision provided to developing therapists. It is very probable that some of 
the deficits in knowledge regarding the development of ethics codes, the importance of state 
statutory requirements and the relevance of significant court cases could be the byproduct of 
inadequate supervision. Furthermore, it is likely that perpetuation of misinformation about the 
duty to warn bias and other results pertinent to this study are related to problematic supervision.  
It is unlikely that clinical supervisors question their own presuppositions about the nature of the 
Tarasoff duties.  It is certainly beyond the scope of this particular research project to be 
speculative or unduly critical of the current system of supervision of psychologists and 
counselors. However, as mentioned before, the ethics code for psychologists includes standards 
related to the maintenance of competence (Harrar, VandeCreek, & Knapp, 1990; Recupero & 
Rainey, 2007).    
  It is the responsibility of the supervisor to maintain his or her competence in areas in 
which they practice, which would include a measure of competence regarding the adequate 
supervision of other clinicians. It is simply too easy to say that the solution to this potential 
problem would simply be more training for supervisors. Supervisors should be in a position to 
role model a certain degree of flexibility when approaching clinical scenarios involving 
homicidal patients and potential duties to third-parties including a reasonable degree of 
knowledge of the Tarasoff duties and more importantly, local statutory requirements.  
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  It was hypothesized that there would be no relationship between continuing education 
activities in the area of ethics and the accuracy scores of respondents on the Tarasoff-related 
cases. There was, in fact, no relationship between reported continuing education activities and 
the accuracy scores of respondents on the Tarasoff-related cases. Similar results with respect to 
continuing education activities were observed by Pabian, et al., (2009) in their research on 
psychologists’ knowledge of state statutes. The APA (2006) has reported that 26 states mandate 
continuing education hours in the area of legal and ethical issues. Currently, seven states have no 
continuing education activity requirements for licensure renewal. Research indicated that 
psychologists from states with both mandated and non-mandated ethics training tended to 
describe their continuing education activities as favorable and, in some instances; those activities 
increased therapist confidence about risk management (Neimeyer et al., 2011). The exact 
relationship between ethics training, continuing education activities and the knowledge of 
Tarasoff-related duties is not clear.  It would appear, based upon this research and the work of 
others, that continuing education activities and/or mandated ethics training has little impact on 
knowledge of Tarasoff-related duties. Tolman (2001) as part of an attempt to develop 
recommendations for clinical training related to the duty to protect, surveyed several pre-doctoral 
internship programs in Michigan to assess the degree of training provided to interns on issues 
related to the original Tarasoff decisions, as well as information specific to the state of Michigan. 
He reported that 92% of the training programs surveyed indicated that they provided some kind 
of didactic instructions to their students on issues related to duty to warn. However, only 50% of 
the programs indicated that they provided specific training and information to students regarding 
the nature of Michigan's duty to protect statute. Only 25% of the programs indicated that they 
provided any information or training to their clinical students regarding state specific case law. 
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Tolman (2001) reported that at least one of the training directors did not seem to be familiar with 
the Michigan statute and requested a copy of the law from the researchers (2001, p.398). Tolman 
(2001) overall expressed concern about a lack of training regarding statutory requirements and 
about the lack of a risk educator within the internship sites. 
Concluding Summary 
This study utilized a series of questions regarding the initial Tarasoff decisions and a 
collection of scenarios based upon the particulars of actual court cases involving Tarasoff-related 
duties to evaluate therapists’ knowledge and understanding of these cases. It was hypothesized 
that the overall knowledge therapists have regarding the original Tarasoff decisions, and 
subsequent Tarasoff-related court cases, would be low and that there would not be significant 
differences found between accuracy between counselors and psychologists. The data in this 
study seem to support these hypotheses. 
 Furthermore, it was hypothesized that there would be no relationship between accuracy 
ratings of post-Tarasoff-related court decisions and therapists' years of experience or with 
continuing education experiences. The data from this study appeared to support this hypothesis 
as well. The data from this study indicated that approximately 88% of the sample reported that 
they were somewhat or quite familiar with the cases known as Tarasoff and yet their overall 
understanding of the basis and the scope of the cases was quite low. Furthermore, participants 
rated their degree of confidence within the range of 2.75-3.04 out of the possible score of four. 
Therapists in general, despite inflated confidence levels, did not anticipate actual court decisions 
accurately. Also, it can be concluded that the majority of the sample in this study overestimated 
their understanding of the initial Tarasoff cases. For example, less than 20% of the sample 
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correctly identified the fact that the original Tarasoff duties could be discharged by hospitalizing 
a threatening patient. Similarly, approximately 66% of the sample in this study endorsed a 
statement that the Tarasoff duties could be discharged by verbally warning a victim.  Another 
60% of the sample believed that the California court systems can generate mandates relative for 
all 50 states. The language between the original Tarasoff decision and the relevant West Virginia 
statute articulating an exception to confidentiality is quite different. Furthermore, 60% of the 
total sample in this survey believed that the original Tarasoff court mandated that all mental 
health professional codes of ethics be amended to include mandatory notification of client threats 
directed at third-parties. Thus, it is likely that the sample in this study not only had a lack of 
understanding about the implications of the original Tarasoff decisions, they were likely to also 
be unaware of relevant state statutes regarding this issue. Thus, in effect, they may be 
subordinating state statutes to one court decision from another jurisdiction. It would appear that 
these data indicate that the majority of the participants in this sample believed that there is a duty 
to warn, it is a national standard of care and that the court in the original Tarasoff case mandated 
both changes in professional codes of ethics and behavior generally governed by state 
legislatures.   
   The specific manifestation of the Tarasoff duties within local jurisdictions has, by and 
large, become more of a legal question than an ethical question. The significance of subsequent 
court cases, including the ones used for the basis of this study is found in the manner in which 
they impact the scope and permutations of the current form of the duties and the impact upon 
state legislatures. 
The apparent misunderstanding of the nature of the relationship between relevant judicial 
findings and a particular ethics code, as it relates to managing clients that are potentially harmful 
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to others, has the potential to impact risk management and clinical decision-making. Specifically, 
nearly 40% of the sample in this study indicated that they had experience with Tarasoff-related 
duties and yet seemed to exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the original 
Tarasoff cases, as well as the implications of those decisions relative to ethical behavior. It 
behooves prudent therapists to have a working knowledge and understanding about, not only 
their particular state statute, but also court cases within their jurisdiction and outside their 
jurisdiction.   
The findings in this study have potential serious implications for practitioners in the state 
of West Virginia. Furthermore, continuing education experiences and years of practice are not 
related to accuracy scores derived from case analyses underscores the complexity of 
understanding the evolving concept of Tarasoff. 
Critique of the Project 
One of the criticisms of this study is to be found in the selection of cases for analysis. 
Although the rationale for the selection of these particular cases was articulated elsewhere in this 
document, a case could be made that the selection of those cases was somewhat arbitrary or 
biased so as to increase the difficulty level. A second concern involves the brevity of the case 
scenarios and the limited alternatives associated with each scenario. Each scenario could have 
been considerably lengthier. Each scenario was developed to encapsulate a particular theme upon 
which the particular Tarasoff-related case was decided. 
 A related limitation involves the multiple-choice format associated with each scenario. 
Most of the scenarios had one pair of answers reflecting the presence of a duty to warn or protect 
for two different reasons and the lack of a duty to warn or protect for two different reasons. 
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There was only one “correct” answer per scenario. It is conceivable a respondent could have 
endorsed the “correct” action (…there was a duty to warn or protect …”) for the “wrong”    
(different from the court’s reasoning) reason. Therefore, there may be alternative ways of scoring 
these types of scenarios in future research. 
 Another limitation of this study was the failure to include specific questions about West 
Virginia state statutes regarding unauthorized release of confidential information. Given the 
serious misunderstanding of the relationship among court decisions, codes of ethics and state 
statutes, the addition of that particular variable would have added greatly to this particular 
project. 
  This research design has the possibility of having used a non-representative sample of 
mental health therapists. It is certainly possible that responders and nonresponders differ in some 
significant way which is presently unknown. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Suggestions for future research include evaluating the confidentiality beliefs of therapists 
relative to their willingness to potentially breach confidentiality. This particular research project 
could shed light on the personal belief system of the therapists and how that relates to their 
willingness to carry out a Tarasoff duty. It would be an extension of the work done by Haas et 
al., (1988).  Furthermore, it would also provide clarity on the issue of what percentage of mental 
health therapists still believe in absolute confidentiality compared with those that believe in 
conditional confidentiality.  
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Second, research needs to be conducted with practitioners in West Virginia in such a way 
as to include therapists’ understanding of state statutes and privilege issues and how those 
variables impact their reasoning of Tarasoff-related duties. 
 Third, another research project could evaluate the impact of involuntary commitment 
relative to therapists’ experiences with duty to warn scenarios. The availability of involuntary 
commitment proceedings may greatly impact the decision-making process for therapists 
confronted with a potential duty to warn or protect scenario. 
 Fourth, another interesting research project could be a closer examination of the 
consultative process in a Tarasoff-related duties scenario. Specifically, researchers could 
evaluate how therapists choose their consultant and assess how the consultant manages the 
perceived risks for consulting in situations involving duties to third-parties. Furthermore, it 
would also be constructive to understand under what conditions a consultant would refuse to 
proffer advice to a peer. 
 Fifth, another potential research project might involve a closer look at what therapists do 
after they have issued a Tarasoff warning. It would be enlightening to understand the 
interventions and strategies therapists would use after they have issued a Tarasoff warning. The 
Tarasoff warning is the duty to the third-party. Therapists still have other duties to their clients 
after such warnings are given.  
Another potentially viable research project could involve a qualitative design to 
understand the process by which therapists’ reason through Tarasoff-related scenarios. A related 
qualitative study could also be done to understand the experiences of those individuals who are 
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the targets of the verbal threats and the impact those threats have on them as well as their 
relationship with the perpetrator. 
Finally, psychologists who obtain prescription privileges may have additional duties to 
warn or protect as many Tarasoff-related cases have been litigated on the issue of dangerous 
drivers due to sedation from prescription medication (Pettis, 1992). 
 Proposal for Remedy 
This project, as well as the conclusions of other researchers, highlights the lack of 
knowledge and understanding of state statutes and judicial decisions regarding Tarasoff-related 
duties. Because there is no national standard of care regarding Tarasoff, the major thrust of any 
set of solutions which might address the documented lack of knowledge in this area, must occur 
at the state level. Each jurisdiction has dealt with the Tarasoff duties differently. Some 
jurisdictions have mandated the duties by statutory requirements while others have extended 
discretionary judgment to its clinicians. Herbert & Young (2002) have cautioned that clinicians 
who practice in states which have discretionary statutes, like West Virginia, might consider 
approaching an interpretation of that statute as if it were an affirmative duty. 
Currently those seeking licensure renewal in the state of West Virginia are required to 
provide documentation regarding continuing education hours in the area of ethics. However, 
there are no guidelines regarding the specific content of those continuing education experiences. 
It is proposed that the West Virginia Board of Examiners require that all psychologists, who are 
qualified and certified to provide clinical supervision, be required to demonstrate competence in 
relevant state statutes regarding exceptions to authorized disclosures of protected health 
information. Also, the Board should maintain information regarding known Tarasoff-related 
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court cases that may impact practitioners in the state. This information should be promulgated to 
interested parties semiannually. This information should be collected and distributed for 
informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice or legal opinion. 
Furthermore, those individuals who seek licensure in the state of West Virginia, or licensure 
renewal, should be expected to demonstrate their competencies in these areas prior to issuance of 
their license. Also, the West Virginia Psychological Association should offer an annual 
continuing education session specifically related to the review of relevant West Virginia 
statutory language regarding Tarasoff-related court cases and other potential mandatory reporting 
requirements including child abuse and neglect as well as elder abuse and neglect. 
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Appendix 
 
  West Virginia Therapists' Knowledge of Tarasoff­ related Court Cases Survey 
  
  Intro and Demographic Information 
 Age range: __20-29   __30-39  __40-49   __50-59   __60-69   __70+ 
 Gender  __F  __M 
 Number of years in practice___ 
 Highest degree:__ Masters      __ Doctoral 
 Degree:     __Psychology __Counseling__Social Work 
 Current site of practice : __Private practice __Hospital __Academic __Community Mental 
Health __School psychology __Employee Assistance Program 
 Independently Licensed __ Yes  __No 
 Do you describe your community as rural or urban? __Rural __Urban 
 Have you ever been contacted by a peer for consultation in a duty to warn or protect 
situation? __Yes __No 
 Have you ever received training specific to the area of a therapist's duty to warn or protect a 
third party? __Yes  __No 
 If your answer was yes to the previous question, was the training: __ included in an ethics 
class which was part of your graduate training __included in a training or inservice on 
general, legal issues in clinical practice __ specific to the topic of  a therapist's duty to warn 
or protect. 
 When was your most recent training experience in the area of a therapist's duty to warn or 
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protect a third party? __within the last year  __within the last 2 years__  within the last 5 
years__ more than 5 years ago. 
 In your clinical practice, have you ever had to warn a third party because of a client’s 
threats ?__Yes  __No            
If yes, whom did you notify during the most recent intervention? __ Police only__ Intended 
victim only  __Police and intended victim 
What was the relationship between the client and the target of the threat?   __Spouse 
__Partner___Family member __Coworker__Another provider  __Other non-family member                 
 
 How familiar are you with the legal decisions of the cases known as Tarasoff ? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 Please answer the following questions (true or false) regarding your understanding of the 
cases known as Tarasoff . 
 The court mandated that only intended victims be notified of threats directed at them. 
 The court mandated that only the local police be notified of a threat directed at an 
individual. 
 The court stated that the duty to protect third parties may be discharged by hospitalizing the 
client making the threat. 
 The court concluded that a therapist could discharge the duty to protect through the process 
of verbally warning the intended victim. 
 The decisions in the Tarasoff  cases mandated that therapists in all 50 states are required to 
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warn and protect intended victims based on clients' verbal threats. 
  The court in the Tarasoff  cases required that all mental health professional codes of ethics 
be amended to include mandatory notification of client threats directed at third parties. 
 The decisions in the Tarasoff  cases are not applicable to suicidal threats. 
 
 Instructions for Scenarios and Scenario #1. 
What follows are five scenarios based on actual court cases. Please evaluate these scenarios and 
respond to the questions which follow each.  
Scenario #1 
Dr. Wells was treating Mr. Black for anger problems, adjustment problems related to marital 
separation and job stress.  During one session, Mr. Black was discussing his anger toward his 
wife and threatened to “tear up” his estranged wife’s house and set it on fire since he was “the 
one making the house payments.” Despite interventions during that session, Mr. Black remained 
angry and refused to withdraw his threat. He subsequently broke into the house and set it on fire.  
He was arrested for destruction of property and arson and his estranged wife sued Dr. Wells for 
not alerting her about the threat. 
Applying your knowledge of your state code, your understanding of your professional ethics and 
your clinical judgment, what you do in this case? 
 a. I do have a duty to warn / protect because his wife could have been injured during the crime. 
b. I do have a duty to warn / protect because therapists have a duty to prevent violent crimes. 
c. I do not have a duty to warn / protect because there is no duty to protect property. 
100 
 
d. I do not have a duty to warn / protect because the threat had no intended victim. 
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
What was the decision in this case rendered by the court? 
a. There was a duty to warn / protect because his wife could have been injured during the crime. 
b. There was a duty to warn / protect because therapists have a duty to prevent violent crimes. 
c. There was no duty to warn / protect because there is no duty for therapists to protect  property. 
d. There was no duty to warn / protect because the threat had no intended victim. 
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer based on your awareness of legal cases. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Scenario # 2 
Emily and Jake have been married for seven years and are currently in marital counseling with 
Dr. May.  Jake has been verbally abusive in the past and Emily filed a domestic violence petition 
against him two years ago which is currently not in effect.  During a joint session, Jake threatens 
to kill Emily and himself if marital therapy fails to save their marriage.  Emily said that she has 
just learned to live with his anger outbursts.  Later that week, Jake physically assaulted Emily.  
Emily sued Dr. May for failure to warn and protect.   
Applying your knowledge of your state code, your understanding of your professional ethics and 
your clinical judgment, what you do in this case? 
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a. I do have a duty to warn / protect because the threat was made face-to-face. 
b. I do have a duty to warn / protect despite previous threats. 
c. I do not have a duty to warn / protect because she was already aware of the threat. 
d. I do not have a duty to warn / protect because I could not have protected her from the assault. 
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
What was the decision in this case rendered by the court? 
a. There was a duty to warn / protect because the threat was made face-to-face. 
b. There was a duty to warn / protect despite her knowledge of previous threats. 
c. There was no duty to warn / protect because she was already aware of the threat. 
d. There was no duty to warn / protect because there was no other action the therapist could have 
taken to protect the victim.   
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer based on your awareness of legal cases. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Scenario #3 
Kevin is a 25-year-old male who was brought to the emergency room of a hospital by the 
Sheriff's Department for aggressive behavior and acute cocaine intoxication.  During his 
evaluation by the nursing staff and the attending physician, it was determined that he was HIV-
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positive.  While staff was attempting to render medical care, he became agitated and began to 
destroy furniture in his treatment room.  After Kevin began to threaten the staff, the physician 
summoned the hospital security guard to Kevin's treatment room.  The security guard attempted 
to restrain Kevin and during an altercation with the guard, Kevin bit the guard in such a way that 
body fluids were exchanged.  Months later, the guard developed HIV and he sued the hospital for 
failure to protect him.     
Applying your knowledge of your state code, your understanding of your professional ethics  and 
your clinical judgment, what you do in this case if you were on the hospital staff ? 
 a. I do have a duty to warn / protect because the medical staff have a duty to others treating the 
patient. 
b. I do have a duty to warn / protect because of the combination of violence and an infectious 
disease like HIV. 
c. I do not have a duty to warn / protect because universal precautions are standard procedures 
for all hospitals. 
d. I do not have a duty to warn / protect because facilities do not have duties to protect individual 
staff. 
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
What was the decision in this case rendered by the court? 
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a. There was a duty to warn / protect because the medical staff have a duty to others treating the 
patient. 
b. There was a duty to warn / protect because of the combination of violence and an infectious 
disease like HIV. 
c. There was no duty to warn / protect because universal precautions are standard procedures for 
all   hospitals. 
d. There was no duty to warn / protect because facilities do not have duties to protect individual 
staff. 
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer based on your awareness of legal cases. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Scenario #4 
Mr. P. was seen for the first session with Dr. D. who found the patient to be suicidal and referred 
Mr. P. to an inpatient treatment unit due to suicidal thoughts.  Two days later, Dr. D. received a 
telephone call from Mr. P.'s father who told him that Mr. P. was divorced and making threats of 
violence toward his ex-wife's new boyfriend, Mr. B.  Dr. D. had not heard these threats during 
his interview with the patient so he notified the hospital currently providing care to Mr. P. 
The next day, the inpatient psychiatrist told the patient's father that he was planning to discharge 
the patient that same day.  Alarmed, the father called Dr. D., who contacted the psychiatrist and 
urged him to re-consider.  The psychiatrist stated that because the patient was not suicidal, he 
was going to follow through on the plan to discharge him that day. Mr. P subsequently was 
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discharged and he murdered his ex-wife's boyfriend. The estate of the deceased sued Dr. D. for 
failure to warn / protect.   
Applying your knowledge of your state code, your understanding of your professional ethics and 
your clinical judgment, what would you do if you were Dr. D.? 
 a. I do not have a duty to warn / protect the boyfriend of his ex-wife because the information did 
not come from the patient. 
b. I do have a duty to warn / protect the boyfriend of his ex-wife by alerting hospital staff about 
the threat. 
c. I do have a duty to warn / protect the boyfriend of his ex-wife despite the source of the threat.   
d. I do not have a duty to warn / protect the  boyfriend of his ex-wife because the patient is not 
under my care.   
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
What was the decision in this case rendered by the court? 
a. Dr. D. had no duty to warn / protect hospital staff because the information did not come from 
the patient. 
b. Dr. D. had no duty to inform the hospital staff of the threat because the information was  
hearsay. 
c. Dr. D. had a duty to warn / protect the new boyfriend regardless of the source of information. 
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d. Dr. D only had a duty to inform the hospital staff of the threat. 
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer based on your awareness of legal cases. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Scenario# 5 
Dr. D.  is conducting an independent psychological evaluation with Mr. P. an employee of a 
local utility company following an incident in which Mr. P. was accused of a serious safety 
violation and appearing to be “impaired.” They reside in a state which has a state statute that has 
only a duty to protect third parties but provides no immunity for therapists who disclose 
information to meet the duty to protect. Dr. D provided informed consent about the scope of the 
evaluation and the unique relationship among the examiner, the company, and Mr. P.  During the 
evaluation, Mr. P became angry discussing his supervisor and threatened to “blow up the plant” 
if he were terminated because of the results of the evaluation. Dr. D. passed the threat on to the 
supervisory staff who ultimately terminated Mr. P. 
Mr P. sued Dr. D. for breaching privacy and going beyond the intent and scope of the evaluation. 
Applying your knowledge of your state code, your understanding of your professional ethics  and 
your clinical judgment, what you do in this case? 
 a. I do have a duty to warn / protect regardless of the type of evaluation being conducted when 
the threat is made. 
b. I do have a duty to warn / protect because the threat is serious regardless of the lack of 
immunity. 
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c. I do not have a duty to warn / protect because there is no specified victim identified in the 
threat. 
d. I do not have a duty to warn / protect because, during independent evaluations, the company 
paying for the evaluation is the primary “client,” not the individual being evaluated. 
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
What was the decision in this case rendered by the court? 
a. The therapist was not liable for damages because he complied with the current standard of 
care. 
b. There was a duty to warn because the threat is serious regardless of the lack of immunity. 
c. The therapist was held liable for breaching confidentiality because statute does not include a 
duty to warn only to protect third parties. 
d. The therapist was found to have done no harm because violence may have been prevented. 
Please rate your degree of certainty about your answer based on your awareness of legal cases. 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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